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Introduction
 I live approximately 90 minutes from campus by car. Before heading toward 
M-14/US-23, I fill up my gas tank. While driving, I watch my once full tank read 
less and less, until it is one-half full and I am finally home. I know that my gas is 
used up, disappeared into the atmosphere. But for the most part, I neglect the fact 
that my consumption means that a portion of a collective finite resource is now 
gone forever. 
 When thinking about the environment, we often consider long-term 
concerns: what does this water pollution mean for our world, what is the effect of 
air pollution, how will climate change affect the planet? But when thinking about 
energy and the nonrenewable natural resources that allow for it, the considerations
—for the general public especially—become much more obscure. 
 The first time I carefully considered resource use and management was in 
Professor Disch’s class, Democratic Theory, where we explored the Great Lakes 
Water Compact, an international compact used to manage the resource of the 
Great Lakes by establishing rules on how much water may be withdrawn and for 
what purpose. The second time I examined resource use was in Professor Rabe’s 
class, Environmental Politics and Policy. In his class, I learned for the first time 
about the hydraulic fracturing—or fracking—movement. It was also the first time 
I actively thought about the energy industry and what it means to extract a finite 
resource for energy use.
……………….
 The basic story of energy use is common to most. People understand the 
essentials: that we extract oil, gas, coal—what have you—from the earth. This can 
be done using conventional drilling techniques, or through the use of the 
increasingly popular technique of horizontal hydraulic fracturing, a technology 
known (or criticized) for its use of millions of gallons of water, a mystery mix of 
chemicals, and the blasting of shale horizontally underground. Once the resource 
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is extracted, the common understanding is that somehow the resource is 
transported, exported and converted into an energy form that people can use to 
power their cars, trains, planes, houses, businesses, toys, appliances—you name 
it. Beyond these uses, we may only think about our energy use and consumption 
when we get our monthly gas and electric bill; that is, when we recognize the cost 
of this energy as determined by our utility company. That, or when the power 
goes out and in a state of darkness we recognize what we are missing (they do say 
you only know a good thing when it’s gone). Despite our completely dependent 
relationship with energy and the resources that allow for it, a discontinuity exists 
between our recognition of the services that the resources of oil and gas provide, 
our recognition of the impacts of the use of those resources, and our recognition 
of the resources themselves. 
 As mentioned above, the common person is generally aware of the services 
that oil and gas provide, that is, anything energy related. But the average citizen 
does not often recognize the impacts of the use of those resources. That citizen 
may not completely understand or think about the impacts of his and his 
neighbor’s energy use on a typical day. She may not know how the use of the 
resource effects the land, water and air quality as well as the lives of people who 
live in areas surrounding production sites of energy sources.
 Although our citizen may not recognize or acknowledge these issues on a 
daily basis, policy does. This is why we see programs or regulations that mitigate 
problems associated with the production and consumption of energy sources. 
These include programs that attempt to address the problems of pollution, 
destruction, or climate change, as is the case with discussions of carbon taxes. In 
this sense, the citizen relies on policy to question and seek answers to problems 
not always transparent to the public eye.
 In a similar manner, the representative citizen does not often recognize the 
resources of oil and natural gas for the value of the resource itself. The value of 
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the resource itself can be best appreciated by considering what it means for it to 
be gone. Imagine a state, occupied by a future generation of individuals just like 
us who have used up the last of the finite energy resources that the state relies on 
today. Instead of preparing for this moment and saving the wealth of the resource 
by looking for alternative options or conducting research, the generations before 
this generation focused only on the extraction of the resource and the 
capitalization of that wealth. This state that has lost its previous form of wealth, is 
left impoverished, without its primary source of revenue and energy. If 
collectively this were the fate of many states, the world may be left completely 
impoverished and with an energy crisis. This situation, though extreme, paints a 
picture for the value of a resource in and of itself.
 In this case, unlike questions of resource impact, policy does not often 
recognize the importance of the resources themselves and the importance of 
having a plan to replace them. In questions of nonrenewable natural resource 
management, policy does not provides answers through programs or regulations 
that mitigate the problems associated with resource use. In this sense, policy is 
failing us by failing to recognize what is finite. 
 Energy sources are nonrenewable. We know oil and natural gas will run out 
some day, although whether that will be in five, 50, 500 or 5,000 years is up for 
question. This finite quantity of energy sources brings up policy questions of 
whether we are able to recognize the value of the resource itself, whether we care 
to protect this value for future generations and whether we should act to address 
and manage our use of the nonrenewable resource. This finite quality of energy 
sources leaves questions of whether solutions exist to mitigate use and preserve 
the use of resources for future generations. If these solutions exist, what are they? 
 That is what this thesis seeks to address. In this thesis I will explain that we, 
and policy more specifically, should care about how the resource is used and 
managed with considerations for future generations. I will explain that there is a 
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solution to managing the use of the nonrenewable natural resource so that its 
value is protected for future generations to come. I conclude with a policy 
recommendation of how to address and answer these questions.
Roadmap
The structure of this thesis is as follows:
 In the first chapter, I explain the field of environmental economics, and 
clarify why it is an appropriate framework to address questions of natural resource 
use. I then consider externalities, property rights, natural resource management 
and the rights of future generations as concepts. I will also provide some 
examples of “market-based solutions” to provide context for the use of that term 
in later chapters. This chapter will conclude having explored sustainability and 
how we care about future generations when considering resource use. It will also 
conclude having commented on the importance of political feasibility.
 In the second chapter, this thesis will explore oil and natural gas as 
representative nonrenewable resources. It will then expand on concepts defined in 
the first chapter by reviewing externalities associated with oil and natural gas 
production, as well as property rights associated with oil and natural gas. In this 
chapter I will review current market-based solutions to oil and natural gas 
problems, such as the carbon tax. I will conclude by reviewing literature regarding 
resource management of oil and natural gas and rights of future generations.
 In the third chapter I will provide my solution to questions of managing 
resources for future generations: severance taxation. In this chapter I will clarify 
the term ‘severance tax’ more specifically. Building upon concepts defined in the 
first chapter and re-worked in the second chapter, this third chapter will attempt to 
prescribe how severance taxes may be used to address problems of oil and natural 
gas production and use. That is, how severance taxes can address resource 
management and the rights of future generations to oil and natural gas.
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 In the fourth chapter I will examine the case studies of Alaska and North 
Dakota to provide descriptive evidence for current severance tax structure in the 
United States. I will explore these severance taxes as a test to examine whether 
the prescriptions made in the third chapter are a current reality or something 
severance taxes do not currently address, but should. This commentary will be 
designed to explore whether we can adapt severance taxes as a potential 
sustainability project, resisting the temptation of exploitation and short term 
profit. 
 The conclusion will provide a policy recommendation for states in using a 
severance tax to fully and comprehensively address resource management for the 
future. This solution will be contingent on the implementation of severance taxes 
as well as appropriate allocation of severance tax revenue. It will also rely 
ultimately on the political feasibility of this solution. I will conclude with 
commentary on the implications of this thesis for promoting further research on 
severance taxation and resource management.
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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Chapter 1
 Sitting in my introductory sustainability course in the beautifully 
renovated Dana Building, which houses the School of Natural Resources and 
Environment, I remember reviewing concepts associated with various 
environmental ethics. This was interesting because I already understood there 
were debates surrounding energy and the environment, but I guess it had never 
dawned on me that there were also debates regarding what form the solutions may 
take. I learned that value systems play a role in how people understand the 
environment and attempt to mitigate and solve the problems they recognize. I 
learned there was no right answer, but merely a set of arguments for or against 
any framework.
 Imagine, for example, the section in which our class used Marxism to 
criticize capitalism from an environmental perspective. The business school 
students in this class resisted this argument, while the Program in the 
Environment students fully backed some of the arguments. And I, as a political 
science major, watched the interactions and debates between these two camps of 
students with great interest. 
 Fast forward a year or so and I recognize the relevance of these ethical 
arguments when choosing my own thesis topic. Deciding to look into natural 
resource management and severance taxes puts me into the already existing camp 
of environmental economics. With this decision I began to think, what are the 
benefits to this approach? What are the drawbacks? This is what part of this 
chapter will explore. In doing so, I begin my argument for this thesis, but I also 
bring larger meaning to my own college experience through the reflection and 
implementation of arguments explored in past classes.
…………….
 In order to understand the management of natural resources such as oil and 
natural gas from a theoretical perspective, I must first provide context on the 
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current literature surrounding environmental policy. This chapter seeks to provide 
that context by discussing the theory of environmental economics. It will also 
address the concepts of the externality, property rights, market-based solutions, 
natural resource management and rights to future generations in order to provide a 
foundation for discussing the potential goals of nonrenewable natural resource 
management. 
 This chapter will conclude by arguing specifically that the rights of future 
generations to nonrenewable natural resources can be understood as a market 
problem that environmental and ecological economics recognizes as vital to solve. 
This chapter will also shed light on how a solution can be achieved, namely 
through a tax and revenue allocation scheme.
Environmental Economics
 In the long term, the economy and the environment are the same thing. 
If it's unenvironmental it is uneconomical. That is the rule of nature.
—Mollie Beattie, Former Director of the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service1
 In a broader context, environmental economics is one approach to 
addressing environmental issues and resource management. Still, environmental 
policy is broad, defined by many movements and ethics, such as 
Pricing Non-Renewable Natural Resource Use
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1 Parenteau, Patrick. 1997. “She Runs With Wolves: In Memory of Mollie Beattie.” The 
Trumpeter 14 No.2. http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/176/218.
transcendentalism;2 conservation versus preservation;3 Aldo Leopold’s “land 
ethic”;4 and deep ecology,5 to name a few. These ethics require recognition, so 
that the solutions they produce can be better understood. As Judith Layzer lays out 
in the introduction to her book, The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into 
Policy, “(1) environmental policy conflicts almost always concern fundamental 
differences in values, and (2) the way problems are defined and solutions depicted 
plays a central role in shaping how those values get translated into policies.”6 The 
values of environmental economics are distinct from other approaches to the 
environment. For example, environmental economics places a material value on 
the environment in a way that contradicts the way many other environmental 
ethics understand the value of the environment. This valuation by environmental 
economics can be better understood from an ethical framework. 
 Many environmental movements reflect one of two ethical standpoints: 
anthropocentrism or ecocentrism. Anthropocentrism places human considerations 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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2 Transcendentalism was advocated by Henry David Thoreau and held that “human potential 
lay in intuition and a close relationship to the natural world” See Robbins, Paul, John Hintz, and 
Sarah A. Moore. 2010. Environment and Society. United Kingdom: Jon Wiley & Sons Ltd. 69.
3 The debates of conservation and preservation defined the historical argument over Hetch 
Hetchy Valley and whether it should be protected for the landscape it was, or if it should be 
converted into a reservoir for the benefit of people. On one side of this argument was Gifford 
Pinchot who advocated for conservation. That is, he advocated for “the efficient and sustainable 
use of natural resources.” This conservation argument promoted a utilitarian approach to the 
environment. On the other side of the argument was John Muir who promoted a preservation ethic
—an ethic that advocated for the protection of the environment for its own sake (Robbins, Hintz, 
and Moore 2010, 68-69).
4 Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic focuses on the idea that humans are a member of their biotic 
community, which includes the “land,” or the combination of the soil, waters, plants and animals.  
Because humans are a member of the biotic community, they cannot dominate the land, but rather, 
they must respect the biotic community’s fellow members as equals. Leopold once wrote of the 
Land Ethic, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 70).
5 Deep ecology is a term that was created by philosopher Arne Naess as a response to what he 
called “shallow ecology” or mainstream environmentalism. Deep ecology is characterized by 
attention to the “deeper questions” and an ecologically-focused worldview. It emphasizes the 
interconnectedness of all things and the intrinsic value of nature (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 
74).
6 Layzer, Judith. 2012. “A Policymaking Framework (Chapter 1).” In The Environmental 
Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 3rd ed., 1. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
above those of nature, while ecocentrism is an ethical position that believes that 
ecological concerns should be above human priorities and central to the decision 
making process.7 The problem with environmental economics, according to 
critics, is that it cannot maintain ecocentric values.8 The very principle of the 
environment as an asset demonstrates that environmental economists view the 
environment relative to its human use. This is especially problematic when the 
values of nature cannot be measured monetarily. Take, for example, the inherent, 
aesthetic, or evolutionary value of a species. This “worth” does not indicate a 
tangible good or service that we can value in monetary terms. It therefore makes 
economic valuation in these situations especially difficult.9
 Environmental economics also falls under the scrutiny of many 
environmentalists, as they believe that capitalism is largely, if not primarily, 
responsible for environmental degradation. To them, it seems misguided to think 
that the market can reverse the damage that a market society has caused. Robbins 
et al. mirror this very thought when they state, “As global trade continues to 
devour, mobilize, and dump resources, objects, and fuels at an accelerating pace, 
it becomes difficult to imagine how such energies could ever be harnessed and 
simultaneously controlled.”10 
 The centerpiece of an environmental economics approach is the notion of 
the environment as an asset. This means that the environment is seen to provide a 
number of services, from raw materials for energy and production to services for 
consumers like air and water. This conceptual framework allows environmental 
economics to focus on preventing the “undue depreciation of” the environment’s 
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7 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 67)
8 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 43-44)
9 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 42)
10 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 44)
value.11 By valuing the environment in this manner, environmental economists 
employ a “cost-benefit” analysis to decide whether prevention strategies are 
warranted and how much sense it makes to invest in them in order to address 
environmental concerns. 
 It may seem heretical (and certainly anthropocentric) to reduce the 
environment to the set of “services” it provides and to attempt to set a monetary 
value on those services, but that is precisely what it means to conceive of the 
environment as an asset. Still, an environmental economics approach has certain 
merits that make it a useful framework for understanding and addressing 
environmental issues. For example, the environmental economics approach falls 
into the framework of our society; it does not require a major transformation of 
our current social values and individual mindsets to work. It is “the most 
dominant, widespread, and uncritically accepted ways of thinking about the 
environment in the early twenty-first century.”12 In this sense, using an 
environmental economics approach does not require waiting until the goals and 
understanding of society change. Instead, it requires using the structure in place to 
try and solve problems. The benefit then, is that we can act now.
 Environmental economics is relevant to the discussion of how to manage 
natural resources because it provides a framework to find solutions to 
environmental problems. Environmental economics is “the application of the tools 
of economics to the topic of environmental and resource issues.”13 Tietenberg and 
Lewis comment,
Both ecological economics and environmental economics provide a basis 
not only for identifying the circumstances that degrade the environment, 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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11 Tietenberg, Tom, and Lynne Lewis. 2009. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 
Eighth Edition. Addison-Wesley Series in Economics. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.
12 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 44)
13 Berck, Peter, and Gloria Helfand. 2011. The Economics of the Environment. 1st ed. Boston, 
MA: Pearson Education, Inc., publishing as Addison-Wesley. 2.
but also for making clear how and why that set of circumstances supports 
degradation.14
They state that environmental (and ecological) economics concerns itself with 
using market forces to incentivize sustainable environmental outcomes. In this 
sense, environmental economists use the market to explain and solve 
environmental issues.
 I move forward with this framework of environmental economics as this 
next section will continue the discussion of the principles of environmental 
economics. Although the field of environmental economics encompasses vastly 
diverse concepts, for our purposes, I am interested in exploring only two: 1) the 
concept of the externality; and 2) that of rights of future generations. These 
concepts are connected, especially when discussing nonrenewable natural 
resource management. I will explore and define these concepts in the following 
sections so as to provide foundation for future discussions of oil and natural gas 
resource use and management.
Environmental Economics and Market Failures
 Environmental economists provide a particularly acute analysis of what 
they term “market failures” for environmental goods. Market failures are 
instances of perverse outcomes that occur when the production or exchange of a 
good is not efficient.15 Berck and Helfand explain that market failures for 
environmental goods are often described by the following categories: lack of 
ownership or transferability; open access; externality; public goods; providing for 
the future and government caused- failure.”16 I am most interested in their 
commentary on the concepts of the externality and providing for the future 
Pricing Non-Renewable Natural Resource Use
 11
14 (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009)
15 (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 34)
16 (Berck and Helfand 2011, 46-47)
because these two categories are ones that are closely related to questions of oil 
and natural gas use as well as use of other nonrenewable natural resources. When 
dealing with oil and natural gas, questions of what is the impact (what is the 
externality) as well as questions of resource management and conservation for 
future generations are common, as later sections will indicate. 
 Berck and Helfand define an externality as “an effect, other than a change 
in prices, of a market transaction on a nonparticipant in that market…the effect is 
called an externality because it is external to the market.”17 This means that the 
market participant causing the effect is not paying for that effect. Berck and 
Helfand also discuss the idea of “providing for the future” by clarifying, “If 
people put inadequate weight on the effects of present activities for the future, the 
future may end up without sufficient resources.”18 This means that by ignoring the 
impact of our activities today, we may leave future generations with a lack of 
resources. I will next explore these concepts in further detail. In the midst of this 
discussion I will also look into solutions to market failures as a focus of 
environmental economics.
Externalities in Environmental Economics
People 'over-produce' pollution because they are not 
paying for the costs of dealing with it.
—Ha-Joon Chang19
 In economics, an externality refers to spillover costs or benefits. Tom 
Tietenberg explains, “An eternality exists whenever the welfare of some agent, 
either a firm or household, depends not only on his or her activities, but also on 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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17 (Berck and Helfand 2011, 47)
18 (Berck and Helfand 2011, 47)
19 Chang, Ha-Joon. 2011. 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. New York: 
Bloomsbury Press.
activities under the control of some other agent.”20 By this he means that the 
externality is a market failure, where one agent does not face all the consequences 
of his actions. In this sense, an externality is that which is external to the agent’s 
costs. Berck and Helfrand also clarify why externalities are seen as a “market 
failure.” They state: 
Externalities are common. They are, however, unlikely to be addressed 
adequately by private markets; the participants in the market decision have 
no reason to think about the effects of their activities on third parties, even 
if the third parties suffer from their exchange.21
This means that those causing externalities will often not work to eliminate them. 
While Arthur C. Pigou is credited for the concept of the externality,22 substantial 
literature attempts to redefine and rework that concept.23 However, for purposes of 
our discussion, we will remain and work with a simple definition: an externality is 
an impact, either a cost or benefit, that an agent (collective or individual) faces as 
a result of another agent’s actions.
 According to Tietenberg, externalities can be either positive (external 
economy) or negative (external diseconomy). With a positive externality, the 
affected party benefits from the externality, while with a negative externality, the 
affected party is harmed or damaged by the externality.24 When discussing 
environmental concerns, we are most interested in talking about a negative 
externality, that is, for example, the harm to the environment that a company’s 
pollution causes. This is because searching for positive externalities does not 
Pricing Non-Renewable Natural Resource Use
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20 Tietenberg, Tom. 2004. Environmental Economics and Policy. 4th Edition. The Addison-
Wesley Series in Economics. Colby College: Pearson Education, Inc.
21 (Berck and Helfand 2011, 49-50)
22 Based on discussions found in: Pigou, Arthur C. 1932. “Welfare and the Nation Dividend.” 
In The Economics of Welfare, 4th Edition. London: Macmillan and Co.
23 For example, in 1960 Ronald H. Coase reworked solutions associated with externality 
problems. He argued that externalities can be most efficiently mitigated through bargaining 
between agents (Robbins, Hintz, and Moore 2010, 33).
24 (Tietenberg 2004)
allow us to target external problems and prescribe solutions, while addressing 
negative externalities does permit us to do so.
 In order to better understand the concept of the externality, it may be 
useful to review some examples. If we return to Tietenberg’s commentary, he 
explains that a steel company’s waste, when dumped into a nearby river, will 
provide a negative externality of pollution and a loss of business for the resort 
hotel located downstream.25 In this example, the steel company is not bearing any 
cost related to its decision and will most likely continue making the decision that 
causes water pollution, as long as that decision comes at no cost. In a similar 
sense, a factory that is emitting chemicals into the air, if unregulated, will most 
likely continue to pollute the air. This pollution would be harmful to the air 
quality of the surrounding area, imposing an external cost to the health and 
happiness of the citizens of that area. But from an economic standpoint, because 
that decision to emit comes at no cost to the factory owner, this market failure 
may persist.
 Of course, there are market externalities that occur in situations unrelated 
to the environment.26 But when we talk about the environment and externalities, 
our focus often becomes that of a negative side effect of an agent’s action, like 
pollution. This project is specifically interested in the externalities of resource use 
and the relation that has to the rights of future generations to that resource. This 
adds greater complexity to the notion of an externality because it conceives of 
negative side effects extending over time which means that agents in the present 
have responsibilities toward future agents whom they may never actually meet—
An idea I will explore in later sections. With this concept of the externality 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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25 (Tietenberg 2004)
26 Such as situations between individual agents where one person’s activity comes at some 
cost or grievance to another.
established, I will now move our discussion forward to talk about property rights 
in order to establish its relation as a solution to externalities.
Property Rights
 The concept of property and rights has an extensive literature.27 According 
to Tietenberg, however, in economics, “property right refers to a bundle of 
entitlements defining the owner’s rights, privileges, and limitations for use of the 
resource.”28 These property rights then assign the rules that each agent may 
follow. Tietenberg clarifies that understanding property rights will help clarify 
how environmental problems arise from government and market allocations. Take 
the example from our previous section, in which the steel company polluted the 
water that both it and the resort hotel accessed. In that case, because the water 
belonged to neither agent, the steel company was allowed to pollute in a manner 
that created problems—negative externalities— for the resort hotel.
  Some scholars, such as William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates argue that 
“[t]he source of an externality is typically to be found in the absence of fully 
defined property rights.”29 Baumol and Oates clarify that in situations where 
property rights can be redefined, doing so oftentimes serves as an option for 
addressing an externality. For example, consider the case of transferring public 
ownership to private. In the example of the steel company and the resort, the 
externality could be removed if the steel company proceeds to buy off the river 
Pricing Non-Renewable Natural Resource Use
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27 Take for example the work of political theorist John Locke. Locke said in his Second 
Treatise of Government, Chapter V: Of Property (1690), that man has property “in his own 
person.” That is, man owns his body and the labor of that body. According to Locke, man is able 
to obtain property by mixing his labor with nature; “The labour that was mine, removing them out 
of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.” See Locke, John. 2008. 
“Second Treatise of Government.” In Modern Political Thought, 2nd Edition, 285–353. United 
States of America: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
28 (Tietenberg 2004)
29 Baumol, William J., and Wallace E. Oates. 1988. The Theory of Environmental Policy. 2nd 
Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 26.
and the land downstream. As the owner of both the river and the land, the steel 
company would no longer cause harm to the resort downstream and would 
remove the negative externality. Of course, this approach is contingent on a 
number of things. Most importantly, it requires that the river can in fact be 
purchased and transferred from public property to private. It also requires that the 
resort is willing to sell its land, which might be unlikely. Furthermore, 
privatization will still fail to address the long-term damage to the river.
 As this indicates, there are situations where redefining property rights may 
not be the best solution; “Establishing rights in ‘clean air,’ for example, is not a 
simple matter. There may moreover be other reasons for desiring free access to 
certain socially held resources.”30 With this, Baumol and Oates refer specifically 
to examples such as pollution and rights to resource use, where property 
boundaries are difficult to establish and where people want resource use to remain 
public. In this study, the approach of redefining property rights to manage 
externalities will not work. This is because the resources of oil and natural gas and 
their externalities will remain a problem for many despite who benefits from their 
use. This discussion and the externalities of oil and natural gas will be further 
reviewed in Chapter 2. 
 In short, property rights are discussed here to clarify their relationship to 
externalities. As we can see, situations where property rights are poorly defined 
exacerbate the problem of the externality; thus, redefining property rights might 
be a sufficient solution. In situations where property rights cannot be redefined 
there are alternative regulatory measures to consider, such as market-based 
solutions.
The Implications of a Severance Tax
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30 (Baumol and Oates 1988, 28)
Market-Based Solutions
 The goal of environmental economics is to address market failures as 
expressed via externalities through market instruments. The concept of market 
instruments refers to solutions that can be achieved through the market. Robert 
Stavins and Bradley Whitehead argue that market-based solutions used to address 
environmental issues and externalities can be divided into six major categories: 
pollution charge systems; tradable permits; deposit-refund systems; reducing 
market barriers; eliminating government subsidies; and providing public 
information.31 I will briefly explore these concepts in order to establish a greater 
understanding of market-based solutions and their operation.
 Pollution charge systems, according to Stavins and Whitehead, “assess a 
fee or tax on the amount of pollution that a company or product generates.”32 This 
type of tax, they clarify, would be applied specifically to the amount of pollution 
generated, not to the amount of resource extracted. The goal with this market-
based instrument, then, would be to incentivize the company to reduce their 
carbon emissions in a manner that makes most sense to them economically. 
Furthermore, a tax-based scheme (such as a pollution charge system) also has a 
secondary property of revenue generation. This property allows for revenue 
allocation considerations.
 Under a tradable permits scheme, the government would set a target 
allowance for pollution in an industry or area.33 The government would then 
distribute permits that allow companies to emit a certain amount of pollution. 
Depending on a company’s circumstances it may prove more cost effective for 
them to lower their emissions and sell their surplus permits. Similarly, companies 
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that emit an amount over what their permit allows for may find it more cost 
effective to buy permits from other companies. In this sense, the firms themselves 
determine how the permits will be distributed.
 Yet another market-based solution can be found in deposit-refund systems. 
Deposit-refund systems refer to instruments such as beverage-container deposits 
where consumers pay a surcharge when making a purchase and get the money 
back when they return the product for recycling. Reducing market barriers refers 
to measures that make exchange easier. Eliminating government subsidies refers 
to the idea of removing subsidies that encourage wasteful practices when the 
market price would be better fit to promote more environmentally friendly 
practices. Providing public information relies on disclosure programs, such as the 
Toxic Release Inventory,34 to allow consumers to make informed decisions and 
incentivize companies to act in a more environmentally friendly way to attract 
customers.35   
 As this section has shown, there are a number of ways to address 
externalities associated with environmental issues. Different market-based 
solutions are targeted to different problems. By the end of this chapter I clarify 
specifically what problem I seek to address when considering nonrenewable 
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natural resource use and management. I will explore the necessary properties of a 
solution to that problem and will use Chapter 3 to name the specific policy 
solution with those properties. With that, I now turn towards another concept 
within environmental economics: the rights of future generations and 
sustainability.
Rights of Future Generations as a Concept
A society grows great when old men plant trees 
whose shade they know they shall never sit in.
—Greek Proverb36
 When discussing environmental economics and the externality, we come 
to what may be understood as one type of externality: the externality of 
nonrenewable resource use that impacts the rights of future generations to that 
resource. This section will explore the term “rights of future generations” in 
general. The section that follows will continue this discussion within the 
environmental economics framework specifically, and justify why we can 
consider the rights of future generations an externality that must be accounted for 
via a market-based solution. It will also begin to identify taxation and revenue 
allocation as the solution to address the rights of future generations to 
nonrenewable natural resources.
 When discussing the rights of future generations in regards to 
environmental issues, we are considering what right future generations have to 
natural resources and environmental quality. This concept is often described with 
the term “sustainability.” In order to first understand the concept, it is useful to 
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explain the literature and history of the term outside the environmental economics 
framework.
 Discussions of resource use and development in relation to people’s 
present and future rights are not new. In 1972, Donella Meadows and colleagues 
published a report for the Club of Rome in which they used a world model to 
investigate trends of global concern, including the depletion of nonrenewable 
resources. In 1987 the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations—formally 
named the World Commission on Environment and Development—defined the 
term sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present  
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”37 In so doing they emphasized the importance of supplementing adequate 
resources to today’s generation but not at the expense of the future; they promoted 
intra-generational and inter-generational equality.38 In 1992 the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development met at the Rio de Janeiro Summit 
where they established certain principles for respecting and recognizing global 
development and environmental integrity. Within their principles, they highlighted 
the importance of considering both the current and future generations’ needs. 
They also introduced the “precautionary principle” which stated: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.39
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At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the 
United Nations produced Agenda 21 as a plan for sustainable development. 
Within Agenda 21, they also highlighted the importance of considerations of 
future generations. Specifically, they advised governments to adopt national 
strategies for sustainable development and noted that the goals of these 
governments “should be to ensure socially responsible economic development 
while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future 
generations.”40 As these reports and summits show, the idea of sustainability and 
rights of future generations has been considered across nations.
 Beyond this history, we can delve further into the literature to gain a better 
understanding of the concept of rights of future generations. Harriss probes us to 
think about the rights of future generations when he questions, “is the present 
cheating the future?”41 Jeurissen and Keijzers furthermore qualify this concept 
with “the principle of generational equality.” They define the principle of 
generational equality as the idea that “moral considerations should be impartial 
over generations.”42 In this definition they argue that we have a moral obligation 
to take the future into account when making our own decisions about depletion 
and pollution. They argue that although we are uncertain about the preferences of 
future generations, we can make the assumption that they will want resources and 
access to a clean earth.43 
 For rhetorical purposes, I will mainly use the term “rights of future 
generations” when discussing these ideas further. For a sense of clarity, when I 
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say rights of future generations, I am referring to the concept that future 
generations should have access or rights to the resources we use, specifically 
nonrenewable natural resources, or some sort of substitute. This concept suggests 
that the present generation take into account these rights when making decisions 
that might threaten them. 
 Using this intuitive understanding and explicit definition of the rights of 
future generations, we now turn to understand these rights within an 
environmental economics framework. The concept of the rights to future 
generations within the framework of environmental economics expands to not 
only what the rights are, but how the present generation ought account for them.  
Rights of Future Generations in Environmental Economics
 There is something fundamentally wrong in treating the Earth 
as if it were a business in liquidation.
—Herman E. Daly, former World Bank economist44
 In a traditional economics framework, there is a tendency to devalue the 
future.45 That is, the understanding is often that the future is worth less to decision 
makers than the present. This devaluing is called “discounting” and is 
demonstrated through the “discount rate.” Discounting and the discount rate refers 
to the process of calculating the present value of the distant future.46 It is a 
numerical way to express the value judgment that the present is worth more than 
the future and that beyond a certain point, the worth of the future to current 
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generations is insignificant.47 That is, people who live now inherently prefer 
current over future consumption.48 In regards to resource extraction specifically, 
discount rates tend to skew extraction toward the present, since “they give the 
future less weight in balancing the relative value of present and future resource 
use.”49
 Economist William Nordhaus also provides some commentary on discount 
rates. In a critique of the Stern Review he explains that discount rates are central 
to questions of climate change policy, as well as all investment decisions.50 He 
explains that the discount concept reviews the weight of the economic welfare of 
generations over time, with a zero time discount rate representing the equal 
treatment of all future generations and a positive time discount rate representing a 
reduced welfare of future generations.51
 Of course this discount rate is problematic because it directly challenges 
the argument that we should care about future generations and their rights to 
nonrenewable natural resources. As Jeurissen and Keijzers argue in regards to the 
discount rate, “This assumption would thwart the principle of generational 
equality, because costs and benefits of future generations would count less than 
those of present generations.”52 This means that under this structure, traditional 
economics assumes that investment in the future does not make economic sense 
because the future is “worth less.” 
 Although the future may be devalued from a traditional economics 
standpoint, several authors have worked to show why discounting is not a 
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completely sound economic concept and why a high discount rate is especially 
inapplicable within an environmental economics framework. For example, Pigou 
argued that discounting is not necessarily economic. He stated that although 
people will prefer present satisfactions to future satisfactions of equal magnitude, 
that preference does not imply that the present satisfaction of a given magnitude is 
greater than a future satisfaction of the same magnitude. In this sense, he shows 
that the existence of preference for the present over equally certain future 
satisfactions “does not imply that any economic dissatisfaction would be suffered 
if future pleasures were substituted at full value for present ones.”53 With this, 
Pigou reveals that discounting is not necessarily economic in decision making for 
individuals. However, he does acknowledge that the concept of discounting 
becomes complicated when we consider satisfactions not belonging to the present. 
That is, he acknowledges that “our desire for future satisfaction would often be 
less than for present satisfaction because it is very likely that the future 
satisfaction will not be our own.”54 Pigou mitigates this discrepancy by arguing 
that although individuals may discount the future, government need not. He states 
that the state should protect the interests of the future: “It is the clear duty of 
Government to watch over, and, if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend, 
the exhaustible natural resources of the country.”55 Nordhaus mirrors this through 
his precaution that when considering environmental questions, individual 
preferences are not applicable because they would greatly discount the future. 
This, he says, “has no necessary connection with how social decisions weight 
different generations.”56
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 Howarth also provides an argument about discounting. He demonstrates 
why discounting may not be entirely applicable within an environmental 
economics framework and specifically within climate change considerations. 
Howarth argues that although individuals may discount future private decisions, 
that does not mean that policy makers should discount the costs and benefits to 
future generations.57 He also explores the concept of stewardship: the duty of 
present individuals to protect and conserve environmental quality for future 
generations as moral grounds for why discounting the future is unjust.58 
 Costanza and Daly also provide a critique of the discount rate. They argue 
that while individuals do discount the future, they may discount too much, leading 
to disastrous situations. Jeurissen and Keijzers parallel this observation when they  
state, “Realistic expectations must undergird any discounting of the future. Risks, 
for example, will become near certainties, if sustained over long time.”59 In this 
sense, individual behavior and preferences may not always lead to optimal social 
behavior.60 Costanza and Daly then argue accordingly:
 [T]he discount rate used by the government for public policy decisions 
(like valuing natural capital) should be significantly lower than the rate 
used by individuals for private investment decisions. The government 
should have great interest in the future than individuals currently in the 
market...”61 
With this, Costanza and Daly reflect a similar argument as Pigou: that the 
government should value the future more than individuals. Given this argument, 
we can understand that there is reason for policy to make socially optimal 
decisions for the general public when the public would tend to do otherwise.
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  Beyond this review of the discount rate, there is much literature in the 
field of environmental economics dedicated towards the value and rights of future 
generations through sustainability.62 These authors argue mainly that, when 
considering environmental economics, we care about sustainability and the 
protection of resources for future generations. I will now explore a few of these 
authors’ specific arguments.
 Environmental economist Tom Tietenberg elaborates what he terms the 
“sustainability criterion.” He states that the sustainability criterion means that 
future generations should not be left worse off than current ones:
In essence, the sustainability criterion suggest that earlier generations are 
at liberty to use resources that would thereby be denied to future 
generations as long as the well-being of future generations remains just as 
high as that of all previous generations. On the other hand, diverting 
resources from future use would violate the sustainability criterion if it 
reduced the well-being of future generations below the level enjoyed by 
preceding generations. One of the implications of this definition of 
sustainability is that it is possible to use resources (even depletable 
resources) as long as the interests of future generations could be protected. 
Do our institutions provide adequate protection for future generations?63
Tietenberg thus claims that the sustainability criterion requires that we take care 
of future generations interests, but that does not inhibit us from utilizing resources 
today.  As long as we are protecting and regulating resource use in some manner, 
we may achieve the sustainability criterion. He then ends with the question of 
whether our government institutions provide adequate protection for future 
generation. As Tietenberg and these other authors have shown, there is an 
understanding that it is the role of the government to protect resources for the 
future. This thesis will seek to answer Tietenberg’s question by showing that 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
26
62 (Tietenberg 2004; Costanza and Daly 1992)
63 (Tietenberg 2004, 86)
current institutions do not sufficiently protect nonrenewable natural resources for 
future generations, but there does exist a solution for state institutions to do so. 
 Daly and Constanza, as ecological economists, also provide insight on 
sustainable development in light of resource depletion. In doing so, they provide a 
framework for understanding how the rights of future generations are important in 
ecological economics. As ecological economists, they take a slightly different 
approach to economics than environmental economists; they greatly value 
sustainability and the “precautionary principle.”64 They also value the 
preservation of natural capital as opposed to addressing the concept of 
externalities, (which is the core of environmental economics).65 
 In their article, Natural Capital and Sustainable Development, Daily and 
Constanza describe natural capital as “the stock that yields the sustainable flow.”66 
More specifically they explain the terms renewable natural capital and 
nonrenewable natural capital. According to them, renewable natural capital 
(RNC) is a stock that yields a harvestable resource or it is a flow of ecosystem 
services. The examples they give include sunshine, apples and fish.67 In contrast, 
nonrenewable natural capital (NNC), they explain, yield no services until 
extracted. The examples they give include fossil fuel and mineral deposits.68 
Because this paper seeks to address finite resource management, Daly and 
Costanza’s discussion of nonrenewable natural capital is relevant to our 
understanding for purposes of later analysis.
 They use these terms (RNC and NNC) in the context of explaining 
sustainable development, that is, of conserving natural capital for future 
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generations.69 The conceptual solution they propose to achieve sustainable 
development is as follows:
Strive to hold throughput (consumption of TNC) constant at present levels 
(or lower truly sustainable levels) by taxing TNC consumption, especially 
energy very heavily. Seek to raise most public revenue from such a natural 
capital depletion (NCD) tax...70 
Costanza and Daly indicate that we must use a tax and raise revenue to address 
the management of natural resources. In particular, they explain the need to hold 
capital constant. That is, they place value on preserving the resource. Tietenberg, 
as an environmental economist, takes a similar position as Costanza and Daly by 
suggesting taxation as a solution. But he furthers this idea by saying that we need 
to ensure fairness and sustainability by paying future generations through a 
revenue allocation scheme. He says specifically of nonrenewable natural 
resources that economically, current “incentives for sharing the wealth from the 
use of depletable resources are biased toward the present… Clearly, this could be 
rectified by transferring some of the created wealth into the future, but how much 
wealth?”71 He continues by arguing the solution of sharing through an example, 
stating that: 
If the first generation keeps net benefits of $40.00 (thereby making it just 
as well of as if equal amounts were extracted in each period) and saves the 
extra 0.466 (the $40.466 net benefits earned during the first period in the 
dynamic efficient allocation minus the $40 reserved for itself) at 10 
percent interest for those in the next period, this savings would grow to 
0.513 by the second period [0.466(1.10)]. Add this to the net benefits 
received directly from the dynamic efficient allocation ($39.512), and the 
second generation would receive $40.025. Those in the second period 
would be better off by accepting the dynamic efficient allocation with 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
28
69 (Costanza and Daly 1992)
70 (Costanza and Daly 1992)
71 (Tietenberg 2004, 435)
sharing than they would if they demanded that resources be allocated 
equally between the two periods.72
Tietenberg thus shows that a revenue allocation scheme could appropriately solve 
resource management problems between two different generations. That is, he 
shows that the present generation could use savings to pay the future generation in 
a way that accounts for prior generations’ use. In this sense, both generations 
would be at least equally well off. We can apply Tietenberg to the overall 
argument of this thesis by noting here that a revenue allocation scheme, where the 
present generation pays the future generation for resource use, is a solution to 
achieving the sustainability criterion. By considering Costanza and Daly’s 
argument in collaboration with Tietenberg’s, we could then use the revenue to 
hold capital constant. This could be achieved by allocating the wealth towards 
creating capital, either through technology, research or investment in renewables. 
In this solution, by combining the arguments of Tietenberg and Costanza and Daly 
we can see that there is complementarity between environmental and ecological 
economics. This overlap between the two disciplines, Van den Bergh argues, is 
fruitful.73 In fact, Van den Bergh argues that there is value in finding overlap 
between multiple disciplines when considering scientific findings at the level of 
policy preparation and political decision. This discussion will be explored further 
in the coming section.
 As these authors indicate, we can care about future generations from an 
environmental and ecological economics standpoint, especially when managing 
nonrenewable natural resources. Both environmental and ecological economics 
suggest solutions and thus can serve as an instrument for us to use to figure out 
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how to make an institutional commitment to the care of future generations. These 
authors have indicated that a tax and revenue allocation scheme would be an 
appropriate solution to addressing the rights of future generations to resource use. 
 I must note here, however, that although these authors show us that in an 
environmental economics framework, we do care about the rights of future 
generations and illustrate solutions to addressing resource management problems, 
no solution will be perfect. This is because we truly cannot capture the 
preferences of future generations. This problem is compounded because we are 
furthermore limited by the fact that every subsequent generation may have 
different preferences, and our discussion does not account for how to rank or 
number generations. This argument truly relies on the assumption that all future 
generations would want equal rights to well-being as the present generation. It 
relies on the assumption that they would prefer and accept monetary replacement 
of resources. Harriss highlights this difficulty of addressing future preferences 
from an economics lens when he states, “Markets today cannot reflect the choices 
of the future. Twenty or 50 years in the future, what evaluations would consumers 
place on natural gas burned now or on the alternatives that are reflected in today’s 
decision-making processes?”74 Nordhaus mirrors this uncertainty when he 
presents this metaphor:
[N]one of these approaches touches on the structure of actual 
intertemporal decision-making, in which this generation cannot decide for 
or tie the hands of future generations. Instead, each generation is in the 
position of one member of a relay team, handing off the baton of capital to 
the next generation, and hoping that future generations behave sensibly 
and avoid catastrophic choices by dropping or destroying the baton.75
 In this sense, we must acknowledge that the solution to managing resource use 
may not be the solution future generations would ultimately prefer, nor can we 
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ensure they would follow through with the decisions we make now. But 
regardless, the solution to managing resource use is an attempt to acknowledge 
the idea that future generations care and deserve equal rights to resource use as 
the present generation. 
 Beyond this argument, a few words can be said about how we may 
understand the rights of future generations (or the failure to account for their 
rights) to resources as an externality (within the environmental economics 
framework). Dr. Sankar explains that “negative intertemporal externalities” occur 
when nonrenewable natural resources are depleted.76 The term intertemporal 
refers to the idea of these externalities occurring across time. He shows us that we 
can think of the depletion of exhaustible resources as a special type of externality. 
Sankar proceeds to discuss how we must correct these externalities through 
market-based solutions (as we discussed earlier in this chapter). He says with 
natural exhaustible resources, such as coal and petroleum, specifically, 
government intervention in the form of pricing schemes to reflect social costs, 
such as depletion costs, is necessary.77 In this sense, he parallels Pigou and 
Tietenberg’s conversation of the role government needs to play in addressing 
sustainability. For example, as Sankar states, “Government intervention is needed 
to internalize externalities in production and consumption decisions of individuals 
so that social optimal levels of outputs and private optimal levels of outputs will 
be the same.”78 
 Tietenberg also gives some insight into the relationship between extraction 
of natural resources and externalities. He states,
What can we learn about the allocation of depletable resources over time 
when environmental side effects are not borne by the agent determining 
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the extraction rate? The price of the depletable resource would be too low 
and the resource would be extracted too rapidly. This once again shows the 
interdependencies of the various decisions we have to make about the 
future. Environmental and natural resource decisions are intimately and 
inextricably linked.79
This means that when we fail to take into account the externalities of resource 
extraction, the resulting lower price causes us to extract too much and/or too 
quickly. With this, Tietenberg shows us how resource extraction has externalities 
and how failure to address those externalities results in the over-extraction of the 
resource.
 This discussion in total demonstrates a number of things. It reveals that 
beyond caring about the future for its inherent value, the rights of future 
generations is an externality. We learned earlier that in environmental economics 
we must seek ways to remove that externality in order to correct the market. This 
means, then, that we must correct this externality of resource management for 
future generations. How can we do so using what we know about environmental 
economics and market-based solutions? Pigou, Tietenberg, and Sankar have 
presented solutions and given us a framework for accounting for future 
generations. They indicate collectively that government intervention is necessary. 
They also argue that a tax and a revenue allocation scheme are the appropriate 
solution. This is because the revenue the tax generates allows distribution of 
wealth to these future generations. Constanza and Daly, the ecological economists 
we explored, provided the argument that the wealth distributed to future 
generations must assist in preserving natural capital. I argued that this could be 
achieved by allocating the wealth towards creating capital, either through 
technology, research or investment in renewables. With this discussion, I identify 
the extraction of the finite resource as a specific externality of nonrenewable 
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resources that I will further explore in the following chapter. For now, I argue that 
this externality, under the basic rule of environmental economics, is something 
that we should aim to address and solve. I end this section now with this thought 
open. 
Political Science Discussion
 Just beyond this discussion of how we should care about the rights of 
future generations in an environmental economics framework is the question of 
how we care in a political science framework, or rather, is there literature to 
suggest we do. Underlying the previous discussion of how we care about 
sustainability and future generations is the idea that policy must play a strong role 
in the decision making process for economic considerations. Although this 
argument was strong among environmental economists, it is important to consider 
the viewpoints across disciplines.
 To briefly recap, the economists we discussed in the previous section 
acknowledged that it is the role of government and policy to make socially 
optimal decisions for the general public when the public would tend to do 
otherwise.80 They argued that especially with environmental issues, policy 
institutions must provide adequate consideration and protection for future 
generations. Nordhaus, an economist, also provides commentary on how to 
consider the connection of economics to policy in light of global warming issues. 
He suggests that policymakers must deliberately consider and put weight to each 
element of data they are presented with:
What should the prudent reader conclude from all this? There are many 
perspectives through which to view the future costs and benefits of 
policies to slow global warming. These perspectives differ in terms of 
normative assumptions, national interests, estimated behavioral structures, 
scientific data and modeling, risk aversion, and the prospects of future 
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learning. No sensible policymaker would base the globe’s future on a 
single model, a single set of computer runs, or a single national or ethical 
perspective. Sensible decision-making requires a robust set of alternative 
scenarios and sensitivity analyses to determine whether some rabbit has in 
the dead of night jumped into the hat and is responsible for unusual 
results.81 
Nordhaus argues in his critique of the Stern Review that prudent policymaking 
requires the consideration of many different perspectives—different models, 
interests, and normative assumptions—in order to make sensible decisions. The 
consideration of alternative scenarios, he says, results in better made decisions. 
Expanding Nordhaus’ argument, we can understand that viewing issues from 
different disciplines provides the benefit of a certain sensitivity to decision 
making; the decision maker can weigh the strengths and weaknesses of many 
approaches, and can consider the overlap between these approaches.
 Despite this recognition of the importance of an interdisciplinary approach 
to scientific issues and political decisions, there appears to be a gap in actual 
collaboration on part of the social sciences. Van den Bergh works to highlight this 
gap between economic discussions and social science considerations, as well as 
the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to issues that qualitative fields 
define and attempt to prescribe solutions to. He states:
Pluralism is very important for an open discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of scientific findings at the level of policy preparation and 
political decision-making regarding environmental policy. EE [ecological 
economics] can develop further along two paths. One involves more 
intense co-operation between natural and social scientists to influence 
each other’s way of thinking and construct join theories and models, in 
line with Wilson’s notion of “consilience”. In the view of many ecological 
economists, this is the main motivation for EE and the area where it can be 
most effective. The other path is to broaden the social science spectrum so 
as to provide for a real alternative paradigm to the neoclassical 
methodology of ERE [traditional environment (and resource) economics]. 
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Some ecological economists seem to think that this is the way forward 
(see Spash 1999). Currently, however, EE may lack the necessary social 
science expertise to support such an ambitious goal. Therefore, it should 
link up with modern research on the relationship between individual and 
group behaviour (institutions and ethics) in biology, anthropology, 
communication science, economics, political science, psychology and 
sociology.82 
Van den Bergh argues that ecological economics can be enhanced by cooperation 
between natural and social scientists. This interaction, he believes, will lead to 
discussions of scientific findings in a policy framework. He also argues that the 
social science spectrum must be broadened to provided ecological economics with 
expertise so that it can serve as a “real alternative paradigm.” In this path, 
ecological economics would expand its understanding on institutions and ethics to 
strengthen its methodology. In both instances, Van den Bergh promotes the role of 
social sciences in cooperating with or assisting the natural sciences.
 Although there is a recognition of the importance of the social sciences in 
relation to scientific findings, there is still not much social science literature to 
suggest a strong overlap has been achieved. More specifically, in regards our 
discussion of market instruments, political science has been largely quiet on this 
issue versus economics. Still, there are several authors who do provide some 
exploration into the overlap of economics and political science. 
 For example, many scholars have worked to discuss a sort of overlap by 
explaining the political feasibility of environmental market-based solutions, such 
as the solutions of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In this section I consider the 
arguments of these authors. I will focus on their overall comments on the political 
feasibility of market-based solutions. In the next chapter I will discuss cap-and-
trade as well as carbon taxes more specifically in order to provide more context to 
the current policy field and answer more questions of feasibility.
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 Similar to the underlying argument of environmental economists that 
policy must play a strong role in the decision making process for economic 
considerations, political scientists reflect on the importance of political feasibility. 
In this sense, political science literature is slightly different than the economic 
literature that says that government must make socially optimal decisions because 
political scientists address the limits of that decision making process. That is, they  
evaluate whether a policy, regardless of how much it has the best interest of the 
public in mind, has any political traction.
 Barry Rabe explores this concept through the case of the carbon tax. While 
we will explore in the next chapter the specific political hurdles of carbon 
taxation, let us consider Rabe’s comments on political feasibility here. Rabe opens 
his argument by discussing the wide support for the market-based solution of 
carbon taxes from academics—economists, political scientists—, politicians, 
think tanks, companies, even the ExxonMobil CEO, presidential advisors, etc.83 
Despite this wide support, he explains, carbon taxes lack “political traction in the 
real world of representative democracies.”84 This lack of political traction exists 
despite the economic advantages that a carbon tax presents. He explores how this 
political traction has resulted in many instances, the failure of carbon taxes to be 
implemented. 
 Through his discussion, Rabe highlights an understanding in political 
science, that even academically supported ideas, if politically unpopular, will 
likely not occur. Thus, with any solution—and more specifically the market-based 
solution that involves the taxation of natural capital—feasibility is an important 
factor in determining its likelihood. It is a factor that is arguably the most 
important when considering whether an idea may become policy. This political 
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science perspective thus shows the biggest underlying limitation to the solution I 
promote. 
 Beyond this discussion of the importance of political feasibility, Rabe 
provides some insight into ways political support may be secured. He looks 
specifically at the ways energy tax revenues are used. He says, of currently 
existing programs that tax electricity, that
[O]ne common feature of the programs is that virtually all of them channel 
all of their revenues into specific renewable energy or energy efficiency 
projects. Many states that levy the charges have set up new institutions (or 
expanded existing ones) to pursue intrastate energy projects…Some states 
have established multiple programs to receive various portions of the 
public benefit funds, some of which distinguish energy efficiency from 
renewable energy while others concentrate on specific technologies.85
Rabe points out here that states employing electricity taxes tied the revenue to 
specific programs relating to technology or renewable energy projects. Kathryn 
Harrison also discusses the importance of how revenues are distributed. She 
states,
The state in turn has several options for disposition of the tax revenues: 
earmark them for environmental spending, return them to taxpayers in the 
form of cuts to other taxes, or fold them into general revenues. The choice 
of option has implications not only for economic or environmental 
benefits, but also for the distribution of costs, and thus the politics of 
carbon taxes…86
Harrison reminds us here that the revenue allocation of a market-based solution 
will have a great impact on the political feasibility of the proposal. This argument, 
in combination with Rabe’s example of state electricity tax revenue allocation 
schemes, showcases the potential feasibility of having a particular revenue 
allocation scheme. In my case, the fact that the political structure of allocating tax 
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revenues towards technology or renewables already exists suggests that the 
argument, that the government must tax capital and allocate revenue towards 
creating capital through technology, research or investment in renewables, is not 
that far-fetched. 
 And finally, Rabe does note that the concept of political feasibility is not 
absolute. He states,
As scholars who have closely examined these kinds of episodes have 
noted, they suggest that it is indeed possible to trump the conventional 
wisdom and enact policy that advances a broad public interest even in the 
face of intense opposition.87
Rabe highlights that there are instances when solutions that truly benefit the 
public become policy, despite lack of political support. There is the indication that 
solutions can overcome questions of political feasibility. The implications for the 
solution promoted within this thesis are that it ultimately it may become policy, 
even if it does face strong political opposition. As these authors have shown, 
political feasibility is an important consideration to the success of potential 
solutions suggested by academics (such as economists). 
 There are also overlaps between our ecological and environmental 
economy discussions from the previous sections and the political science 
discipline. Leigh Raymond, for example, provides insight into the concept of 
resource ownership and how that concept has changed within the political sphere. 
He tells us that earlier principles of resource ownership were shaped by the 
Lockean or Humean perspectives. That is, the belief was largely that existing 
users were the rightful owners or resources; recognition for resource ownership 
favored possession and prior use. He states, “the idea that the public might own 
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the resources was absent from the conversation.”88 In fact, when considering 
political designs for issues surrounding the environment, Raymond argues that the 
“basic tendency to favor the claims of current resource users remained as late as 
2005.”89
 Raymond identifies a shift in this recognition of ownership, however, 
through his examination of climate change policies. He finds that recognition of 
ownership is now shifting towards the public. He states:
After years of treating polluters as prior resource users entitled to private 
rights under any policy of limited entry, political actors are now 
witnessing (and in many cases encouraging) a remarkable normative shift 
in which the public is seen as the rightful owner of natural resource sinks 
and polluters as beneficiaries of a free ride at the public’s expense. 
Existing emitters have tried to block the change, but their efforts continue 
to look like a losing rear-guard action. The idea that we should reward 
polluting behavior with free pollution rights was always a bit implausible, 
and it is now giving way to the principle of public ownership.90
Raymond suggests here that there has been a shift in the way people, and policy 
especially, recognize resource rights. The owner, Raymond argues, is becoming 
more so the public than the previously recognized owner of the private actor. 
Raymond’s argument is relevant in light of our discussion in earlier sections that 
suggested that the government should protect natural capital for its citizens, the 
public. Raymond’s work shows that despite economists’ arguments, the idea that 
the public has claims to resource sinks did not come about in the political sphere 
until very recently. This shift, he argues, in “the apparent agreement that the 
public does indeed ‘own’ some common resources, rather than those who happen 
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to have been using them historically…may be the most important legacy of the 
recent series of changes and controversies in emissions trading policy.”91
 Raymond sheds additional light on the different perspectives on the idea 
of public ownership. He explains that one idea is a more populist, egalitarian view 
of public ownership that is “rooted in a belief that the public itself is entitled to 
certain common resources.”92 This idea, Raymond says, is what supports 
programs that “distribute equal shares of revenue from natural resources to all 
citizens.”93 The other perspective on public ownership of natural resources, is the 
government form of public ownership. This perspective, he argues, favors 
government decision makers over individual citizens as the rightful resource 
owners,94 where decision makers or political elites allocate natural resources on 
behalf of the public at large. He states, “under this conception, revenues from 
natural resource ownership are still put to public use but not necessarily in a way 
that provides equal shares or direct revenue to all citizens as common owners.”95 
 Once again, Raymond’s comments here are relevant to the previous 
discussions. In our prior conversation I reflected on the importance of government 
recognizing the rights of future generations by preserving natural capital. In this 
argument, I implicitly promoted Raymond’s second perspective on public 
ownership, that is, that government allocates and regulates the resource on behalf 
of the public at large. More specifically, I argued that the government should 
regulate resources to allocate wealth towards creating capital, either through 
technology, research or investment in renewables.
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 I end this discussion with Raymond’s argument on the implications of the 
two perspectives of the concept of public ownership. He tells us that the shift to 
public ownership requires now that we determine whether we adopt a populist, 
egalitarian view of public ownership or the view that favors government decision 
makers. “That decision,” he states, “will have critical implications for…future 
political viability.”96 That is, the political direction of the public ownership 
concept is not yet clear. I can apply this discussion to my argument in the previous 
section that the government must tax capital and allocate revenue towards 
creating capital through technology, research or investment in renewables. 
Because this argument promotes public ownership, under Raymond’s argument, it 
may become more and more politically feasible in the modern policy sphere. Still, 
as Raymond indicated, it is not clear yet whether policy will ultimately adopt the 
populist view of public ownership or the government as decision makers view. 
My argument, promoting the government as decision makers in public ownership, 
may be the view that is more generally accepted in the policy sphere, or it may 
not. Further research into the policy sphere would give an answer to Raymond’s 
question and further indication as to the political feasibility of my argument.
  As shown, the discussion of economic solutions is limited in a policy 
sphere based on its political feasibility. As these political scientists have indicated, 
even the best theoretical solutions will face challenges if not supported by 
political interest. These authors did suggest however, that with market-based 
solutions, political like-ability may be better achieved through revenue allocation 
schemes that agree with political perceptions. As Raymond also suggested, 
promotion of resource rights for the public over private interest is a concept that is 
gaining political traction. With this thought in mind, I close this section with the 
reminder of the importance of political feasibility. I will return to this concept in 
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the next chapter when I explore the market-based solutions of cap-and-trade and 
carbon taxation. I will also reflect on the political feasibility of this solution 
promoted within this thesis in the concluding chapter. 
Conclusions
 Thus far, I have laid the groundwork to understanding the field of 
environmental economics. I have shown that in environmental economics, we 
care about externalities and have learned that when an externality exists we must 
address it by redefining property rights, or when that is not possible, by using a 
market-based solution. I have also established that in environmental economics, 
the rights of future generations can be understood as an externality. More 
specifically, I established that in environmental economics, the externalities of 
nonrenewable natural resource use imply an effect on future generations. Using 
this argument I then conclude that: If an externality assumes or implies an impact 
on future generations, then the solution (whether property rights based or market-
based) must account for the future generation, or else it fails to account for the 
entirety of the externality and will thus not be considered a complete solution. As 
the literature in the end of this chapter indicated, solutions to managing the rights 
of future generations may best come in a tax form because of its revenue raising 
ability and potential to pay future generations for resource use. I also concluded 
that the solution could be achieved by allocating the wealth towards creating 
capital, either through technology, research or investment in renewables. 
Underlying this decision of a tax is the understanding that government must 
actively protect and address issues for the common good. In discussions about the 
role of policy, I emphasized the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to 
understanding and addressing problems. With this discussion I also touched on the 
importance of political feasibility when considering the strength of any proposal.  
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 In Chapter 2, I will use these definitions of the externality and rights to 
future generations in order to clarify environmental economics problems with oil 
and natural gas production specifically. The argument that follows in the 3rd and 
4th Chapter will then argue a more specific solution of taxation and revenue 
allocation for these issues. In doing so, we will be interested in the rationale for 
this solution, current examples of this solution and what changes could be made to 
address the problems that will be brought up in Chapter 2. In this sense, using the 
framework of environmental economics, I am taking a normative approach to the 
solution I shall name.
 In order to better understand this approach, I turn to Tietenberg and Lewis’ 
description of environmental economics. They prescribe two different types of 
economics to further understand economic analysis of the environment. They 
explain that there is positive and normative economics. Positive, they say, 
“attempts to describe what is, what was, or what will be.” Normative, on the other 
hand, “deals with what ought to be.”97
  In this sense, normative economics deal with specific value judgments. 
This concept of normative economics will be most relevant for purposes of 
considering the solution of severance taxes and what they do in comparison to 
what they could or should do.
…………….
 Thinking back to my introductory sustainability course, I can recall 
vividly the various ethics and literature we used to explore environmental 
problems. But that was not the only way we explored issues in our local 
community. A few times during the semester we left our classroom to walk around 
and explore sustainability efforts on campus. We viewed the solar panels, the 
water-bottle refill stations and the local food supplier, Student Food Co. right in 
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Mason Hall.  We even went to Ann Arbor’s City Hall and heard Jamie Kidwell, 
the City of Ann Arbor’s Sustainability Associate,98 talk about recent housing 
efforts in Ann Arbor to expand energy efficient housing options. 
 The goal with these interactive learning experiences was to not only work 
to understand what was going on in our community, but also to observe first-hand 
how ethics translate to policy and action. With these experiences, I observed how 
theory does not always translate to reality. I also learned that solutions may be 
altered so that they are accepted as more feasible. I think one of the most 
interesting example of this was when Jamie Kidwell discussed the creation of her 
job. She said that a lot of time was put in coming up with a name that would 
appear appropriate to the public, especially because during that time, 
“sustainability” was just emerging as a word common to public rhetoric. Given 
this discussion, we can catch a glimpse into the importance of the consideration of 
these issues and solutions, not only from a theoretical stance, but also from a 
political one. 
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Chapter 2
 In the Ford school, during a talk sponsored by the Center for Local, State 
and Urban Policy, I heard Susan Christopherson, a professor in the Department of 
City and Regional Planning at Cornell University, discuss why local governments 
are emerging as the prominent respondents to shale gas development.99 During 
her talk, Professor Christopherson specifically mentioned the many impacts 
associated with this process, with resident owners of small parcels or renters; 
regional businesses such as tourism, specialized agriculture and retirement homes; 
and regional residents who absorb indirect and public costs related to safety, 
roads, traffic and air pollution, all serving as the losers of this process, while non-
resident owners of large acreage with minerals rights were the biggest winners. 
Professor Christopherson explained the distribution of benefits: “The benefits 
don’t occur where the drilling occurs, they occur where the expenditure occurs,” 
she said.
 During the question and answer portion of her talk, a member of the 
audience pointed out that a moratorium was a common response of local 
governments. She then asked if there are any other themes in community 
responses. Professor Christopherson replied that some of the best reactions she 
has seen were, surprisingly, in Texas. She explained that they knew how to extract 
the resource effectively—and that is because they tax it. She stated that the Texans 
think the other states are ridiculous; that they recognize that if you are extracting 
the resource, there are going to be impacts. So, they say you need to tax the 
process to address these impacts. Listening to that, I was struck by her response. 
Who would have thought the Texans would be tackling resource use issues within 
an environmental economics framework?
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…………….
 As our previous discussion has indicated, the negative externality is an 
impact that an agent faces as a result of another agent’s actions. It is a 
consequence, whether intended or unintended, of a market action. This chapter 
will explore the externalities associated with oil and natural gas production and 
use. It will also explore the idea of rights of future generations as it relates to oil 
and natural gas.
 I do this to demonstrate why oil and natural gas resource extraction and 
use are representationally problematic relative to the whole category of 
nonrenewable natural resources so that we can understand that there is a need for 
a solution under our collaborative environmental and ecological economics 
framework. Due to the nature of nonrenewable natural resources, as demonstrated 
by the example of oil and natural gas, I will show that the solution must come 
from a market-based solution, not a property rights allocation scheme. This 
solution will involve taxation and a revenue allocation scheme.
Externalities-Oil and Natural Gas
Oh Beautiful for smoggy skies, insecticided grain,
For strip-mined mountain's majesty above the asphalt plain.
America, America, man sheds his waste on thee,
And hides the pines with billboard signs, from sea to oily sea.
—George Carlin, comedian100
 The externalities of oil and natural gas, namely in the form of pollution, 
are not unknown to the American public. It is well accepted that the production 
and consumption of oil and natural gas generate a number of negative 
externalities. I will now consider examples of these externalities.
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 Numerous externalities of oil and natural gas exist on the production side. 
These include impacts from activities such as site preparation, drilling, fracturing, 
well production and operation, and storage and disposal of fracturing fluids and 
flow-back.101 To explore the externalities of these activities more specifically: site 
preparation activities include the clearing of land, construction of roads, 
construction of infrastructure and on-road vehicle activity. These activities create 
externalities such as habitat fragmentation or loss, road congestion and impact on 
stormwater flows. Drilling activities include drilling equipment operation at the 
surface of the ground, drilling of vertical and lateral wellbore, casing and 
cementing, etc. These activities cause externalities such as methane release, noise 
pollution and impacts from drilling fluids and cuttings. Fracturing activities 
include activities such as the use of groundwater, the flowback of reservoir fluids, 
the venting of methane, and the storage of fracturing fluids at the drill site. These 
activities result in impacts such as freshwater withdrawals and flowback, methane 
release and impacts of surface water from fracturing fluids. Well production and 
operation activities include well production, use of condensate tank and 
dehydration unit operation as well as compressor operation. These activities result 
in externalities such as flowback and produced water constituents, volatile organic 
compounds and conventional air pollutants. Fluid storage and disposal activities 
include on-site pit or pond storage, off-site transportation, treatment and release 
by industrial wastewater treatment plants, and deep underground injection. These 
activities result in impacts such as flowback and produced water constituents, 
volatile organic compounds, seismic vibrations and road congestion.102 
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 To further understand the externalities of oil and natural gas production, 
we can look at the example of hydraulic fracturing. Ridlington and Rumpler 
highlight fracturing impacts in their report. In the report they explain that fracking 
production activities have impacts including toxic wastewater, general water use, 
chemical use, air pollution and “damage to our natural heritage.”103 They clarify 
that fracking requires the use of chemicals, which results in toxic wastewater that 
once brought to the surface can become a hazard for drinking water and public 
safety. Beyond that, fracking requires larges amounts of water use in general. 
Fracking activities also result in air pollution which could threaten the health of 
others. Furthermore, the authors clarify that the building of roads, pipelines and 
other infrastructure changes the landscape of our states. These impacts from 
fracking are negatives externalities because the fracking companies place them on 
the public. While the companies reap the benefits from the extraction of natural 
gas and oil, they are not necessarily required to pay for the costs that they bring 
unto others.
 On the consumption side, oil and natural gas are also responsible for a 
number of negative externalities. These include impacts from activities such as 
fossil fuel combustion for electricity generation and the transportation, industrial, 
residential, and commercial “end use” sectors.104 The combustion of fossil fuels 
beyond causing pollution, specifically contributes to CO2 emissions. In fact, 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion are the largest source of CO2 emissions, 
and the sectors mentioned above (electricity generation, transportation, industry, 
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residential and commercial sectors) are the five major fuel-consuming sectors that  
contribute to CO2 emissions.
 We can think of CO2 emissions as an externality because greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (such as CO2) are leading causes of climate change.105 Impacts 
of climate change include rising average temperatures, warming oceans, rising 
average sea levels, more extreme heat and weather as well as species extinctions 
and loss of biodiversity.106 In this sense, the use and burning of fossil fuels cause 
global impacts.
 Beyond the immediate impact of these externalities, there is also 
consideration for the long-term impact of these externalities. That is, there are 
lasting generational concerns built into these externalities. For example, when we 
consider the externalities of oil and natural gas production, impacts such as water 
or air pollution carry not only an immediate effect, but also an intertemporal 
effect. That is, we recognize that the water pollution is not going to suddenly go 
away, but instead will be a problem that lasts many years to come. When 
discussing externalities on the consumption side of oil and natural gas use, we 
mark that their combustion and release of CO2 emissions contributes to climate 
change. Climate change is understood as a problem that will damage and alter our 
earth. Although we are concerned about the impacts this will have on the current 
generation, there is also an understanding that the impacts are not easily reversed 
and are sometimes completely irreversible. We then begin to understand and 
worry about the impacts climate change will have on the earth that our children, 
our children’s children and all future generations will inhabit. 
 This impact that oil and natural gas has on the future is problematic, 
especially from an environmental economics standpoint. Tietenberg explains that 
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we can understand emissions of greenhouse gases as externalities; “Emissions of 
greenhouse gases impose a cost on future generations that is external to current 
generations.”107 He explains that these intertemporal externalities are difficult to 
address, and undermine the ability of the market to produce sustainable outcomes 
because actions to reduce greenhouse gases will cost the current generation 
money but benefits will not be felt until significantly later.108 Still, despite 
economic theory difficulties in addressing tomorrow’s problems, there is evidence 
today that society does care and is making an effort to make change to slow 
climate change, as shown in the United States Climate Action Report.109
 Besides these externalities, there is also an externality associated with oil 
and natural use that may not be immediately considered. This is the externality of 
nonrenewable natural resource use, namely that using oil and natural gas will 
eventually result in the loss of that resource altogether. This means that future 
generations will, at some point, lose access to these resources. I will explore this 
concept later in this chapter.
 Finally, the question of why we care about the externalities of oil and 
natural gas must be addressed. The negative externalities of oil and natural gas are 
important to us because they result in a destruction of our land, our roads, our air 
and our water, and our health. These impacts make it clear that oil and natural gas 
use ruins the planet for us. This destruction concerns us because we currently 
inhabit the earth and want access to a clean and safe environment. When we 
recognize that these externalities ruin the earth for us, we also recognize a 
generational concern, that is, it ruins the earth for everybody—present and future. 
So the question now, from an environmental economics framework, is how do we 
address these inter— and intra—generational externalities? If we remember 
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Chapter 1 when I talked about how to mitigate resource use externalities, I 
explained that the government intervention in the form of pricing schemes 
(taxation) to reflect social costs, is necessary. I will expand on this discussion of 
market-based solutions to oil and natural gas in coming sections. 
Property Rights-Oil and Natural Gas
 In the last chapter I explained that externalities may be removed through 
the redefinition of property rights. As the discussion in the previous chapter also 
concluded, there are situations where redefinition may not be the best solution or 
may not even be possible. Such is the case with oil and natural gas use.
 On the production side of the oil and natural gas industry, there are 
multiple facilities and systems in the production stream. These facilities and 
systems are defined according to their use in the oil and gas industry production 
process and include Exploration, Upstream, Midstream, Refining and 
Petrochemical.110 Exploration refers to prospecting, seismic and drilling activities 
that take place before a company decides where to develop. Upstream refers to all 
facilities for the production and stabilization of oil and gas. Midstream refers to 
gas treatment facilities as well as oil and gas pipeline systems. Refining refers to 
the part of the industry process where oil and condensates are processed into 
marketable products. Petrochemical refers to the production of chemical products 
where the main feedstock is hydrocarbons.
 Depending on where in the process the oil and gas occurs, the resource 
will be at a different facility. This shows that it would be difficult to redefine the 
property rights of oil and natural gas production because the process occurs in 
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many different stages at many different locations. Lipecap and Smith found that 
the development of property rights (unitization) in oil and gas production was 
challenging. They found that the development of property rights in oil and gas 
encountered the following problems: “natural” difficulties because of geological 
conditions, difficulties in trading because of volatile relative prices and 
asymmetric information, and regulatory-imposed difficulties.”111 This means that 
evidence demonstrates that redefining property rights for oil and natural gas is too 
challenging to achieve. 
 Furthermore, there is also the consideration that if we were to find a way 
to redefine property rights for oil and natural gas, it still would not be a complete 
solution to the externalities defined. This is because the externalities of the 
production process effect many and cannot be easily eliminated. As we explored 
in the previous section, externalities from this process included road congestion, 
water flowback and air pollution. Common sense tells us that no matter how oil 
and gas property rights are changed, we can never allocate property associated 
with public goods such as roads, water and air. I can once again turn to Tietenberg 
to further understand how this process will not address externalities:
 Suppose, for example, that the extraction of the depletable resource 
caused some damage to the environment not adequately reflected in the 
costs faced by the extracting firms. This would be an external cost. The 
cost of getting the resource out of the ground, as well as processing and 
shipping it, is borne by the resource owner and considered in the 
calculation of how much of the resource to extract. The environmental 
damage, however, is not borne by the owner and, in the absence of any 
outside attempt to internalize that cost, it will not be part of the extraction 
decision112
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In this sense, redefining property rights to oil and natural gas will fail to remove 
all externalities.
 Furthermore, when discussing the consumption side of natural gas and oil, 
it is once again difficult to redefine property rights. This is because it is difficult to 
define property rights when one reviews the externalities associated with the 
consumption of oil and natural gas. The negative externality associated with oil 
and natural gas use, namely carbon pollution, is a cost that when entered into the 
air, everyone bears. 
 As shown, when it comes to oil and natural gas production and 
consumption, the site of the resource is not always the same as the site of 
production, which is hardly ever the same as the site of consumption. The 
processes of oil and natural gas are carried out in many different places depending 
on the stage of the production or consumption cycle. This means that the 
externalities created during this process are found in many geographic locations. 
In this sense, when addressing oil and natural gas externalities, redefining 
property rights is not a practical solution. I will now turn toward market-based 
solutions to the externalities of oil and natural gas.
Market-Based Solutions-Oil and Natural Gas
 As discussed in Chapter 1, there are a number of current frameworks for 
using market-based solutions to address externalities: pollution charge systems; 
tradable permits; deposit-refund systems; reducing market barriers; eliminating 
government subsidies; and providing public information.113 The dialogue for how 
we can address externalities associated with natural gas and oil specifically 
currently includes the market-based solutions of a cap-and-trade system and a 
carbon tax, which are examples of tradable permits and pollution charge systems, 
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respectively. I will briefly consider these two policy solutions here as sample 
solutions and frameworks that currently exist for addressing oil and natural gas 
externalities. When examining these solutions I will comment on the political 
feasibility of these frameworks, drawing on discussions from the end of last 
chapter. This discussion is meant to provide a brief understanding of current ideas 
for market-based solutions to environmental problems and what challenges they 
face in the policy sphere. I must note that in this exploration, I am not promoting 
these examples as our policy solution. These solutions are fundamentally different 
than the one this thesis has promoted; while this thesis has argued for the taxation 
of natural capital in order to replace that natural capital for future generations, 
these solutions work to reduce pollution. That is to say, cap-and-trade and carbon 
taxation as solutions are not analogous to the problems I seek to address.
 Cap-and-trade refers to a permits scheme when a state determines limits 
on emissions. The state then gives permits that allow individuals or firms to 
possess transferable shares of that limit. These agents can meet the limit 
themselves and reduce their emissions, or they can pay other firms for their 
permits. In this sense, an efficient outcome will be theoretically achieved.114 That 
is to say, emissions will be reduced at a lower overall cost because firms who can 
afford to reduce easier than others can, and other firms, who can more cheaply 
purchase other permits, can also choose to do so.
 Weaknesses of a cap-and-trade approach include geography regulation 
issues as well as issues of practical applicability (considering monitoring and 
oversight demand).115 That is to say, it has a much more complicated structure 
than a taxation market-based solution, for example. Beyond that, cap-and-trade 
often receives much criticism and is not very politically feasible due to its lack of 
public support. 
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 Still, cap-and-trade does have a number of strengths in the political sphere. 
One perceived political advantage is that its complex structure makes it easier to 
obscure the ways in which it imposes costs.116 In this sense, it is less clear how the 
public may be impacted by this regulation imposed on industry. Raymond argues 
that cap-and-trade may benefit in light of the fact that there is strong political 
aversion to new taxes.117 That is to say, it may benefit politically as a more 
popular option over carbon taxation.
 A carbon tax is an example of a “green tax,” which involves taxing certain 
goods or services for consumers or producers in the hopes that the raised price 
will result in decreased use of the resource.118 A carbon tax, then, is a tax against 
oil, natural gas, coal and other fuel industries in an attempt to control greenhouse 
gas emissions that cause climate change.119 This type of tax exists in a number of 
countries including the Netherlands and Norway.
 Hsu explores several strengths of carbon taxation in his book, The Case 
for a Carbon Tax. He argues that a carbon tax would effectively address the 
damages associated with carbon emissions.120 He also argues that an additional 
economic strength of carbon taxes is that it is capital-neutral.121 That is, it is a tax 
and not an investment or a subsidy, so it will therefore not encourage the creation 
of new capital. Beyond that Hsu argues that the carbon tax has the ability to be 
combined with other “regulatory instructions,”122 which means that the carbon tax 
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does not eliminate other future policy options, but rather possesses the ability to 
be used in combination with a number of policies. 
 Harrison argues that carbon taxation has a number of advantages over cap-
and-trade. She says that a carbon tax is easier to implement; it can be applied to 
both large and small polluters; that it offers price certainty which can spur 
business investment to develop and adopt low-carbon technologies; and that 
carbon taxation offers greater transparency in its costs and distribution. She also 
argues that carbon taxation revenue can be used to reduce payroll or income taxes 
to yield economic benefits.123 Rabe also parallels Harrison’s argument by 
explaining that the simplicity and price certainty of carbon taxes are beneficial.124 
 The main weakness of the carbon tax is its lack of political strength, and 
thus, its feasibility. As Hsu points out, many people feel that the carbon tax has 
too much “political baggage” and a low probability of passing.125 Carbon taxes 
have been considered in the United States but they face significant political 
opposition, largely from industry.126 There is also fear of carbon taxation from the 
general citizenry, where the impact of the taxes would be highly visible at the gas 
pump or in the electricity bill.127 Carbon taxes are also objected to for their 
“perceived regressiveness.”128 This means that because a carbon tax is a 
consumption tax, similar to the sales tax, people feel that it could 
disproportionately harm poorer individuals. And finally, the carbon tax faces low 
public approval. Hsu goes as far to say that people consider a carbon tax vile.129 
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In this sense, despite its strengths, carbon taxes face many challenges as a viable 
political solution. 
 These examples are mentioned here to merely show current frameworks 
related to addressing oil and natural gas. It is important to emphasize again that 
these solutions tackle slightly different issues than we have addressed in this 
thesis. Namely, these solutions are carbon pollution based, not resource use and 
depletion based. By this I mean that the market based solutions of a carbon tax 
and cap-and-trade system aim to address the specific externality of carbon 
pollution from oil and natural gas use. In contrast, this thesis expresses the need 
for a solution that addresses all externalities of oil and natural gas use, especially 
the externality of the rights of future generations to a depletable resource (or the 
wealth of that resource). 
 Still, we can acknowledge that the carbon tax, as a tax, does have some 
revenue raising ability that could be used to replace resource use. But, as a 
political strategy, the carbon tax is controversial and would face difficulties in 
expanding its reach towards addressing resource use for future generations. From 
this, in combination with our discussion in Chapter 1, I can conclude that a tax 
would pose as the potential answer to managing all externalities of nonrenewable 
natural resource use because of their general revenue generating power. And as 
we reviewed in the previous chapter, this means that the revenue allocation 
scheme is also an important aspect of the solution itself.
 With this discussion we have learned that about current frameworks for 
addressing the externalities of oil and natural gas use, namely carbon pollution. 
We have learned that these solutions face a number of difficulties, namely 
political feasibility, when it comes to their implementation. These questions of 
feasibility are not to be taken lightly: the carbon tax and cap-and-trade have 
currently failed to gain enough traction to see overall implementation within the 
United States. Although these market-based solutions do not address the 
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extraction of capital as the solution I have proposed will, this discussion is still 
helpful to understand the policy field that our proposed solution will exist in. In 
this coming section I will further explore what it exactly means to say rights of 
future generations when I talk about oil and natural gas use. In Chapter 3 I will 
come more specifically to the policy solution of how to address these questions.
Rights of Future Generations-Oil and Natural Gas
 The nation behaves well if it treats its natural resources as assets 
which it must turn over to the next generation increased, 
and not impaired, in value.
—Theodore Roosevelt, speech to the Deep Waterway 
Convention, Memphis, Tenn., Oct. 4, 1907130
 As we move forward to the concept of the rights of future generations we 
must reflect back on the discussion in the previous chapter about the rights of 
future generations within an environmental economics framework. More 
specifically, I touched on how harvesting a nonrenewable natural resource, where 
the resource will eventually run out, can be considered as an externality. I now 
expand upon and utilize this concept by applying it to the resource of oil and 
natural gas.
 Oil and natural gas are nonrenewable natural resources. Once gone, they 
are gone forever. As Maugeri writes, “Oil resources are finite; this is 
irrefutable.”131 Cakravorty et al agree, “Stylized facts suggest that our planet 
has…limited amounts of natural gas.”132 Tietenberg argues, “Proven crude oil 
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reserves peaked during the 1970s, natural gas peaked in the 1980s in the United 
States and in Europe.”133 This implies that we have reached maximum extraction.
 Still, although it is generally understood that the resources of oil and 
natural are finite, arguments surrounding what this means exactly are common. 
There is disagreement over “peak oil,” which often concerns whether or not we 
have reached peak, or when we might reach it. Those who argue against the 
theory of peak oil often argue that we do not have knowledge of all the reserves of 
oil, or that we will develop technology that allows us to find new reserves.134 Still, 
there is much evidence that suggests we are likely well past the peak.135 For my 
argument, I am not interested in when oil will peak or when the reserve will run 
out. I am rather concerned merely with the fact that a some point in time, the 
resource will run out; policy should act to acknowledge that. 
 Because oil and natural gas are finite resources, our own use leaves 
questions about what that means for future generations. Harriss explains:
And use now of exhaustible resources reflects more or less deliberate 
rejection of interests and concerns about future users. Some things are 
renewable, such as forests, perhaps rather quickly while others take longer. 
Some, such as petroleum, are used up today. Our descendants will not 
have them.136
As Harris details, the current use of nonrenewable resources inherently implies 
that future generations will not have access to them. Tietenberg mirrors this 
argument and the importance of it when he states:
The endowment of depletable resources is of finite size. Current use of 
depletable, nonrecyclable resources precludes future use; hence the issue 
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of how they should be shared among future generations is raised in the 
starkest, least forgiving form.137 
In Chapter 1, I proposed using an environmental economics framework (along 
with ecological economics considerations) to view the rights of future generations 
to nonrenewable natural resources as an externality. I proposed this view because 
our use of nonrenewable natural resources means there is less capital left available 
for future generations. Now I focus on fully identifying the market-based solution 
to that externality.
 From an economic standpoint, as the last chapter indicated, it is difficult to 
account for future generations’ rights within a market structure. Harriss 
elaborates, “Present market prices must reflect the views of buyers and sellers 
today about the future. Yet market prices at present cannot incorporate the 
valuations of persons who will be affected.”138 Still, Chapter 1 indicated that a 
solution in the form of taxation and revenue allocation would allow us to 
distribute the wealth of the resource to the future. This solution does stand as the 
best option to address the externality of the rights of future generations. Yet, as I 
have argued, a market-based solution such as a carbon tax will be insufficient in 
this context because it makes no attempt to directly incorporate the concerns of 
future generations to nonrenewable natural resource use. That is, it does not aim 
to account for the use of natural capital by seeking to replace it. Furthermore, as 
we discussed, the carbon tax already faces a number of difficulties with political 
feasibility that may inhibit its implementation.  
 Harriss explores options to improve our ability to take into account the 
“using up of natural resources”139 within a market-based framework. He briefly 
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touches on property taxes140 and severance taxation141 as potential means to 
addressing the rights of future generations to nonrenewable natural resource use. 
Since we already determined in earlier sections that defining property rights to the 
nonrenewable natural resources of oil and natural gas is difficult and problematic, 
we will instead turn to Harriss’ suggestion of severance taxation as a policy 
solution. We will expand upon this idea regarding severance taxation in the 
coming chapter.
Conclusions
 This chapter has inventoried the externalities associated with natural gas and 
oil. The most important conclusion has been that oil and natural gas, as 
nonrenewable natural resources, imply that the current generation’s use of these 
resources impacts the rights of future generations to the same resources. I 
concluded that oil and natural gas are representative nonrenewable natural 
resource whose externalities lead us to question the rights of future generations. I 
then discovered that these externalities must be addressed under the 
environmental economics framework. I concluded also that redefining property 
rights is not adequate, but rather a market-based solution of taxation and revenue 
allocation would be most appropriate to addressing the externalities in question. 
In this chapter I also considered current market-based frameworks for addressing 
oil and natural gas carbon pollution externalities: cap-and-trade and carbon 
taxation. In doing so I explained the current policy field of these types of market-
based solutions and attempted to address questions of feasibility.
 In the coming chapter I synthesize the information from the previous two 
chapters with the idea of the severance tax that Harriss proposed. That is, I 
explain how severance taxation, as a policy solution, can allow us to take into 
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account the rights of future generations when harvesting nonrenewable natural 
resources.
 Although I will explain severance taxation in greater detail in the coming 
chapter, I would like to disclose further why I am interested in discussing 
severance taxation. First, there appears to be a disproportionate amount of 
attention to oil and natural gas production, policy and impacts versus attention 
given toward this regulatory severance tax. In fact, the amount of severance tax 
literature is conspicuously little. Second, I am interested in reviewing severance 
taxes due to their uniqueness in comparison to other market-based solutions. So 
far these various market-based solutions that we have explored work at the point 
of pollution. That is, they aim to reduce pollution from production or use of the 
resource (such as oil or natural gas). Severance taxes differ from these other 
solutions; they are a unique kind of market-based solution in that they take hold 
earlier at the point of extraction rather than the point of pollution. In doing so, 
they appear to be meant to address a different set of responsibilities—to extend 
beyond our obligations to those whom our actions affect in the present, as 
pollution does, to find a way to also institutionalize our obligations to future 
generations. Let us now reserve this discussion for further consideration in 
Chapter 3. 
…………….
 I think what was most surprising about Professor Christopherson’s 
commentary on Texas was the matter of fact manner in which she recollected the 
Texans’ statement that we must tax. Yes, it does seem pretty intuitive that we 
should better value the resources we use, but it also begs the question, why do we 
often fail to actively address these problems and solutions? Why has Texas 
actively addressed these problems while other states have not been as proactive?
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Chapter 3
 The first time I discussed severance taxation with Professor Lisa Disch, I 
remember, was the first time she had heard of the term. We talked a bit about the 
term itself—severance—and Professor Disch did remark that the language of the 
tax name was in itself, interesting.
 I think she made a great point, especially in light of traditional terms, such 
as production and extraction, that are typically associated with natural resource 
use. The term “production,” implies something is being created, when in fact, in 
the oil and gas industry, it refers to the removal of capital, not the creation. The 
term “extraction,” is closer to the truth in that it acknowledges the removal of the 
resource. But “severance”—to sever—implies to cut, almost forcibly. It is the 
rhetoric of not just removal, but also of death. 
 We have learned that once the resource is gone, it is gone. And this might 
be the tax that recognizes that fact.
…………….
 As I move forward in this exploration of environmental economics and the 
issues of oil and natural gas exploration, I come to the policy solution of 
severance taxation. The Revenue Sources Book for the state of Alaska explains 
the function of the severance tax: “Often referred to as a production tax, the 
severance tax is imposed on a producer as the resource is severed (or extracted) 
from the leased land.”142 
 In past chapters I identified the necessity of addressing the rights of future 
generations in managing a nonrenewable natural resource. I left off with questions 
of how we might use policy to address this issue and what form that solution may 
come in, which I briefly identified as being a taxation and revenue allocation 
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scheme. This chapter further will answer these questions by exploring from a 
theoretical perspective, the role severance taxes may play in helping to manage 
nonrenewable natural resources for future generations. 
 This chapter will be structured as follows. It will first re-iterate the 
problem of rights of future generations in nonrenewable natural resource use. It 
will review several solutions proposed in the literature. Following this discussion 
I will explore how the severance tax functions as a solution and why the 
allocation of revenue serves as the key factor in this solution. The conclusion will 
review the implications of this analysis.
Severance Taxes
 As the last two chapters concluded, the rights of future generations to 
nonrenewable natural resources are necessary to consider from an environmental 
economics lens, but present market situations (at least those commonly explored 
in literature) do not allow us to adequately address the management of natural 
capital. I also explained in Chapter 2 that oil and natural gas are representative 
nonrenewable natural resources that we can target. The question I left off with 
then, is how we can address the rights of future generations to oil and natural gas 
from an environmental economics perspective? How can we achieve a sustainable 
solution? How can we achieve a politically feasible solution? Before addressing 
oil and natural gas severance taxation specifically (Chapter 4), I will first examine 
managing nonrenewable resources in general.
 Let me set up the problem as follows: A state economy relies on the 
extraction of a nonrenewable resource for its economic well-being. Although its 
citizens benefit from the extraction of this resource, the more they extract, the less 
they have available. That is because extraction means diminished natural 
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capital.143 Although the amount of resource left may last for five, 50 or 5 million 
years, the state does acknowledge it will run out. When it runs out they face the 
uncertainty of how to compensate for this lost resource. Although this problem 
may not be one they are directly faced with during their lifetime, the people of 
this state may recognize that the future generations will suffer any 
mismanagement repercussions. Their children may face the problems associated 
with the loss of resource. Still, they need to continue extraction because their 
economy and well-being relies on it. They then decide they need to figure out how 
to manage the resource for this current generation and generations to come. What 
do they do?
 In past chapters I alluded to several solutions and ideas promoted by 
authors. I discussed the sustainability principle, or “restoring intergenerational 
fairness in the use of depletable resources.”144 In regards to nonrenewable 
resources, various writings, such as those by Tietenberg, Daly and Costanza 
promoted the protection of nonrenewable resources for the sake of the future. 
Their arguments however, did not require the present generation to avoid using 
the resource. Instead, these authors suggested achieving successful management 
through taxation on the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources. Tietenberg 
highlights this more closely with his description of Serafy’s work: 
Salah El Serafy has developed an ingenious, practical way to answer this 
question. Calculate the present value of the net benefits received from the 
extraction of a depletable resource over its useful life. This becomes the 
wealth to be shared. Using standard annuity tables, calculate the constant 
annual payments that could be made from this fund forever. (In essence, 
these payments represent the dividends and interest derived from the 
wealth; the principle would be left intact.) This constant annual payment is 
what can be consumed from the wealth created from the depletable 
resources. Receipts in excess of this amount (in the years the resource is 
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being extracted and sold) must be paid into the fund. All succeeding 
generations receive the same annual payment; the payments continue 
forever.145
Although interesting, I am not so much concerned with Serafy’s calculations as I 
am with the description of Serafy’s proposal of payments into a fund that future 
generations could use theoretically forever. This is because, through Sarafy’s 
work and Tietenberg’s description, we can begin to understand the role taxation 
may play in addressing nonrenewable natural resource management. Tietenberg 
continues: 
The payments could be invested in research rather than in instruments 
producing a financial return. Such a strategy might envision, for example, 
setting aside through taxation a certain proportion of all proceeds from 
depletable resources for funding research on substitutes likely to be used 
by future generations.146 
 
With this, Tietenberg confirms the revenue allocation scheme this thesis promoted 
in earlier chapters. As Tietenberg argues, by ensuring that the nonrenewable 
natural resource is taxed and the revenue is properly allocated, we can find a way 
to “repay” future generations for our use of nonrenewable natural resources. The 
repayment exists to ensure that when the resource runs out, there is adequate 
funding to find substitutes. Thus, Sarafy’s proposal serves as a solution to the 
“sustainability principle” or our rights to future generation discussion.
 But just how exactly could this plan be reached in principle? Harriss 
discussed issues of nonrenewable natural resource management. He sheds some 
light on how this solution can be practically realized through the unrealized 
potential of severance taxation. He commented, “Natural resources present greater 
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potential for financing government than has yet been realized.”147 With his 
comment in mind, let us now delve further into severance taxation.
 Severance taxation is a currently existing policy that is employed 
internationally as well as within the United States. Within the United States, 
severance taxation occurs at the state or local level and often targets resources 
such as gas, oil, timber, minerals, and even fish. Severance taxes specifically on 
the nonrenewable natural resources of oil and natural gas occur in approximately 
35 states. These severance taxes either tax the volume of oil or gas produced, the 
value of produced oil and gas, or some combination of those two methods. In this 
sense, these taxes vary widely by state, with some states even calling them 
production taxes instead of severance taxes.148 In a report on oil and gas severance 
taxes prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures, Jacquelyn Pless 
defines the policy purpose of severance taxes: 
Severance taxes help insure that costs associated with resource extraction
—such as road construction and maintenance, and environmental 
protection—are paid by the producers, helping to alleviate potential 
impacts on state and local taxpayers. States distribute revenues in various 
ways, but typically, most of the collected taxes are deposited into the 
general fund. Many states also use the extra revenue to fund conservation 
and environmental cleanup projects and distribute portions of the collected 
taxes to local governments.149
As is clear in Pless’ definition, states often employ severance taxation to generate 
revenue and address present externalities. She does, however, suggest that there is 
some effort towards managing the revenue from the resource to fund 
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conservation. In fact, some states do allocate their severance tax funds towards a 
trust or “Legacy” fund (as I will review in Chapter 4).
 Fundamental to achieving the goal of managing nonrenewable resources for 
future generations by using severance taxation is the question of where the 
revenue goes. As briefly explored above, the severance tax, like any other tax, 
generates a revenue. This revenue is essential to the public interest as it addresses 
many externalities the public faces because of the extraction—construction, 
maintenance, etc.—in a way that alleviates burdens to the public. Tietenberg 
explains the benefit of taxation: “Fees also raise revenue. Successful 
development, particularly sustainable development, requires a symbiotic 
partnership between the public and private sectors. To function as an equal 
partner, the public sector must be adequately funded.”150 But when exploring 
severance taxes as solutions to nonrenewable natural resource management, the 
question becomes what part of the public sector will be funded? Today’s or 
tomorrow’s?
 As we can see, severance taxes are an existing policy measure that taxes the 
extraction of a resource. And in some cases, their revenue goes towards 
conservation measures and trust funds. I propose that the conceptual solution to 
managing nonrenewable natural resources can be realized structurally through 
severance taxation. That is because current severance taxes provide the 
framework to achieve, if they do not already achieve, this goal of addressing the 
rights of future generations.
 The allocation of its revenue is what would bridge the gap between what 
the severance tax does and what it could do to address the rights of future 
generations. The allocation of its revenue is what would differentiate the 
severance tax from any other tax used for generating revenue. It would establish 
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the severance tax as a tax designed for managing nonrenewable natural resources 
and accounting for future generations. The revenue would highlight which 
competing normative framework is actually achieved: sustainability versus short-
term gain. Think of it this way. The severance tax as “any other tax,” would 
generate revenue through its fee. This revenue would then be the state’s revenue 
to spend any way it chooses. This may often manifest itself in dumping the money 
into the general fund to be later spent on public services such as education or 
transportation. That is, it will be spent on the present generation. (This is how 
many severance taxes currently work, as I alluded above and as will be explored 
in the case studies next chapter). 
 While this is a perfectly acceptable way of handling the revenue, it is 
almost analogous to “double-dipping,” and it certainly does not allow the 
severance tax to be a solution to the rights of future generations externality. In this 
case, the present generation is both using up the resource and making extra money 
off of it through the tax. Of course, we can at least recognize that they are 
capitalizing on the nonrenewable natural resource’s value. Still, because I am 
most interested in exploring severance taxation as a nonrenewable natural 
resource management technique, let me now consider how the severance tax 
would function as a sustainability project. 
 The severance tax as a “sustainability project” would account for future 
generations in its structure. That is, it would put a very specific value on the 
nonrenewable natural resource when taxed. The revenue would then account for 
future generations. This would be achieved by allocating the revenue into a trust 
fund to be used by future generations. The fund, as we discussed when reviewing 
Costanza and Daly in earlier sections, must be used to preserve capital. As 
Tietenberg had explained while analyzing Sarafy, this fund would provide funding 
for research into substitutes that could be used by future generations:
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In the case of fossil fuels, for example, one might subsidize research into 
solar energy or the use of hydrogen as a fuel so that, as fossil fuels are 
depleted, future generations would have the ability to switch to alternative 
sources easily, without diminishing living standards in the process.151
 In this sense, by utilizing a severance tax, a governing body would achieve 
balance between generations in the extraction of a resource. The implementation 
of a severance tax is just the first step. The conversion into a sustainability project 
is contingent on the revenue allocation of that tax. That is, revenue allocation into 
a trust fund for future generations to access is the second step. And finally, 
successful implementation of those funds on the part of future generations to 
make up for that resource, by using funding for research into alternatives and 
technology is necessary because it will allow severance taxation to serve as a 
solution to the rights of future generations problem.
Conclusions
 In this chapter I have named severance taxation as the solution to 
managing nonrenewable natural resources to address the rights of future 
generations.
 Before moving forward, I would now like to recap what we have 
determined in our analysis up to this point. Namely, that the goal of 
environmental economics is to remove externalities. Nonrenewable natural 
resources intrinsically include future generations in their externalities. When 
addressing the externalities of nonrenewable natural resource use, the solution 
must account for all externalities, including the rights of future generations 
through the replacement of natural capital. The nature of nonrenewable natural 
resource use means solutions must come from market-based solutions instead of 
property rights allocation schemes. Taxes provide the best option for addressing 
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externalities and rights of future generations because of their revenue generating 
property. Severance taxation provides the proper structure to directly tax the 
extraction of the nonrenewable natural resource. Severance taxation as a solution 
is contingent on the revenue allocation of the tax; the revenue of the severance tax 
must be allocated in a manner that addresses the removal of the nonrenewable 
natural resource. That is, it must replace the resource by investing in renewables 
or by providing for research or technology.
 As this chapter has indicated, the structure of severance taxation provides 
a way to address issues of nonrenewable natural resource management and the 
rights of future generations in an already existing policy framework. This solution 
is contingent on how the revenue from the taxation is allocated. While admittedly 
lacking in economic analysis, this paper provides a look into a policy solution. To 
strengthen this argument I will look at existing policy to explore how it already is 
or could be potentially shaped to address the normative issues explored in this 
paper. This means that we need to examine more closely where the revenue goes 
in actual policy. The next chapter will do this through two case studies. When 
reviewing these two cases, we will be interested to see not only where the revenue 
goes, but also the mindset of the legislatures in creating the severance tax. That is, 
were they interested in recognizing the rights of future generations, or where they 
merely interested in a new revenue source. In reviewing these case studies, I will 
look at oil and natural gas severance taxes as our representative nonrenewable 
natural resource discussed in Chapter 2. 
…………….
 After reviewing this chapter with Ray McDaniel at Sweetland for the first 
time I begin to gather my papers and zip up my backpack. Before I leave I tell 
him about how useful I found reading the Tietenberg book. “But,” I vent my 
minor frustration, “someone recalled the book.” I got the dreaded email from the 
library and I had to turn it in.
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 “That’s what you call karma,” he says, laughing, “at least you know what 
it feels like to want something someone else has.” And with that I nod, wondering 
what future generations would have to say about our resource use, as I leave to 
work on my next chapter. 
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Chapter 4
 Walking into Professor Mika LaVaque-Manty’s office hours, I am greeted 
with a “Hello— I thought of your thesis the other day!” And I stand wondering, 
what could have reminded him of severance taxation? 
 Well, just that, taxes. He explained he had been filling his taxes using 
Turbo Tax. The filling process consists of answering a number of questions, such 
as whether you are a married, whether or not you have any dependents, etc. He 
also stumbled across a few questions asking him if he felt he had extracted any 
resources lately. 
 I laughed.
 Of course I knew severances taxes were real, but it was interesting to hear 
them being applied to everyday society. It was fascinating to hear an example of 
their stealthy infiltration into society, or at least, infiltration into Turbo Tax. 
…………….
 Of course with these theoretical discussions it is always useful to look to 
reality to see how our conclusions compare. I now turn to two case studies to see 
just how applicable this discussion of severance taxes and their potential to 
address the rights of future generations is.
 These case studies are used to showcase a number of things. I explore 
these case studies to show how severance taxation exists in the current policy 
sphere and to see what form severance taxes may take. I also explore them to 
understand the difference between a “sustainability-focused” severance tax and a 
“not sustainability- focused” severance tax. A “sustainability-focused” severance 
tax will be defined as a severance tax that addresses all externalities associated 
with nonrenewable natural resource use including future generations. It does this 
by 1) placing some of the severance tax revenue into a fund for future generations 
and 2) ensuring that the fund accounts for replacement of capital by investing in 
renewables, technology or research. A “not sustainability-focused” severance tax 
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will be defined as a severance tax that does not address all externalities including 
the rights of future generations and does not fulfill the two requirements listed 
above. Finally, I explore these case studies to bring the theory to reality. That is, 
by examining the case studies, I can explore whether severance taxation could 
actually address the rights of future generations. Before exploring these case 
studies, let us first consider state severance taxation on the whole.
State Severance Tax Overview
 Before considering the case studies I have selected, it is useful to have an 
understanding of the general state severance tax climate. This overview is helpful 
to provide further context as to the uniqueness of the case studies I have selected. 
I will now briefly consider all state severance taxes here by examining the percent 
make-up of their severance tax collection to overall state tax collection, with some 
reference to their influence in total state government collection. It is important in 
this consideration to note that the severance tax field is quickly changing as many 
states update, create or change their severance tax, especially as the natural gas 
movement unfolds. Despite the dynamic outlook of this policy sphere, I will focus 
my discussion only on recent state severance tax structure using 2012 Census 
Bureau data152 and data from the National Conference of State Legislatures153 in 
order to provide a quick outlook of all states.
 Severance taxation varies widely on a state to state basis. Still, there are 
some general trends. For example, out of the 50 U.S. States, 15 do not impose any  
type of severance tax. These states include Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
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Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Vermont.154
 On the opposite side of the spectrum, the states of Alaska, North Dakota 
and Texas impose significantly large severance taxes. In fact, in 2012 their 
severance tax collections collectively accounted for roughly 67.4 percent of total 
state government severance collection.155 Interestingly enough, Alaska and North 
Dakota’s severance taxes accounted for 82.1 percent and  56.7 percent of their 
total tax collections, respectively, while Texas’ severance tax only accounted for 
7.5 percent of its total tax collection. Furthermore, Alaska and North Dakota’s 
severance tax revenues helped to drive their total tax revenues to increase by 47 
and 27.3 percent between 2011 and 2012.156 Wyoming is also of note in this 
category, as its severance tax accounted for 37.97 percent of its total tax collect.
 Like Texas, in comparison to total revenue, most state severance taxes 
produce a smaller portion of the state’s total revenue. These states include 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma and West 
Virginia. Their severance taxes make up 3.3, 9.5, 12.43, 4.5, 15.1, 9.62, and 11.7 
percent of their total state revenue, respectively.157  
 There are also a group of states whose severance taxes account for less 
than 2 percent of their total revenue. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.158 
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 These groups reveal that the state severance tax field is diverse, but does 
show some trends, with cases such as Alaska, North Dakota, Wyoming and even 
Texas posing somewhat as outliers. These cases contrast to the other groups of 
states that do not employ severance taxation, or generate a small portion of their 
total revenue from severance taxation. With this foundation established, I will 
now move forward to discuss case selection.
Case Selection
 Although serving purely descriptive purposes, the cases were selected to 
have very similar characteristics. These characteristics included their production 
ranking for oil and natural gas (as according to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration), their state Gross Domestic Product (GDP), state GDP ranking, 
state severance tax revenue, share of state severance tax in total revenue and state 
political party in power at the time the tax was created.
 Before explaining the cases selected, I would like to spend some time on 
why I looked at these variables in particular. Since I am reviewing cases for their 
descriptive purpose, namely whether or not their severance tax is “sustainability-
focused,” I wanted the focus to be purely on how the severance tax and revenue 
allocation is structured. I am not as interested in reasons why the taxes are 
different (which is why these cases are purely descriptive). Still, it could be 
argued that variables such as state GDP played a role in the policy decision-
making process for different cases. In this sense, describing “sustainability-
focused” and “not sustainability-focused” cases may warrant explanations for 
why they are labeled either way. If one case has an economic advantage or a 
resource advantage over another case, it may appear as an explanation for why the 
tax is different. It may also appear that cases were cherry-picked to suit the needs 
of my theoretical argument. To avoid these questions and areas of inquiry, I 
focused on finding states that can be labeled similar in multiple areas.
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 These areas included state GDP, state GDP ranking, state oil and gas 
production ranking, state severance tax revenue, share of state severance tax in 
total revenue and state political party in power at the time the tax was created. 
State GDP and GDP ranking was explored for the reason given above; I wanted 
states with similar economic situations so that differences in the tax could not be 
accounted for through the economic situation of the state. I looked for states with 
similar production rankings (in comparison to all fifty states production rankings) 
so that their resource extraction was similar. Similar to my reasoning for choosing 
GDP, I did not want differences in tax to be attributable to differing levels in 
extraction. In this sense, I wanted states who were either both high, middle or low 
producers. 
 I also examined state severance tax revenue and the share of state 
severance tax in total revenue. This is because states that generate a large source 
of revenue from severance taxes may have different motives than states that do 
not rely on severance taxation. Besides looking for cases with similar revenues, I 
wanted states with high dependence on their severance taxes, because they may 
have more invested when it comes to how the severance tax is structured. In this 
sense I looked for states with a high share of state severance tax revenue in total 
revenue.
 I also sought out cases with the same political party in power, which I 
defined as the state having a governor and majority of the legislature in the same 
political party at the time the severance tax was enacted. In choosing two cases 
with the same political party in power, I wanted to remove any questions of 
whether states acted differently based on their political affiliation.  
 Based on these variables, I selected the cases of Alaska and North Dakota 
for further observation. I will now briefly explore how the cases of Alaska and 
North Dakota compare given the variables discussed above.
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 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Alaska’s GDP (listed in 
millions of current dollars) was 47,910 in 2010, 51,237 in 2011 and 51,859 in 
2012. North Dakota’s GDP (in millions of current dollars) was 35,357 in 2010, 
39,992 in 2011 and 46,016 in 2012.159 Although North Dakota’s GDP is slightly 
less than that of Alaska, the two are relatively comparable. This is made evident in 
data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis that ranks states by GDP. In 
2010, Alaska and North Dakota were ranked 45 and 49, respectively. In 2011, 
Alaska was ranked 44 and North Dakota was ranked 47. In 2012, Alaska was 
ranked 44 and North Dakota was ranked 46.160 As this data indicates, Alaska and 
North Dakota’s GDP are similar, especially when compared to all other states.
 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) data 
collected in 2012, Alaska, with natural gas marketed production (million cu ft) at 
351,259, was ranked as the 11th top producer of natural gas. In comparison, North 
Dakota, with natural gas marketed production (million cu ft) at 179,004 was 
ranked as the 15th top producer of natural gas.161 Based on EIA’s most recent data 
(October 2013), Alaska’s crude oil production ranking was 4, with 16,136 
thousand barrels produced. North Dakota’s crude oil production ranking was 2, 
with 29,191 thousand barrels produced.162 As this data shows, Alaska and North 
Dakota are relatively similar in their production rankings for oil and natural gas.
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 The United States’ Census Bureau provides information on state 
government tax collections. From their data I was able to determine that in 2012, 
Alaska collected 5,787,360 (thousand of dollars) from their severance taxes, while 
North Dakota collected 3,187,112 (thousand of dollars) from their severance 
taxes. Although Alaska collected slightly more, according to the Census Bureau 
data, Alaska was the highest collector of severance taxes, while North Dakota was 
the 3rd highest, ranked after Texas.163
 The Census Bureau report also discusses state government tax collections 
(as we reviewed in the previous section). In their report, they state that in 2012, 
Alaska’s severance taxes accounted for 82.1 percent of its total tax collection 
while North Dakota’s severance taxes account for 56.7 percent of its total tax 
collections.164 The report puts the significance of these numbers in context by 
reflecting that 15 out of the 50 states do not impose any severance taxes.165 
Furthermore, the report points out that the three states of Alaska, North Dakota 
and Texas account for 67.4 percent of total state government tax collections.166 In 
this sense, the role that severance taxation plays in Alaska and North Dakota is 
both vast and unique in comparison to other states.
 The political party in power at the time the severance tax was enacted was 
also the same for both Alaska and North Dakota. The governor of Alaska, 
Governor Sean Parnell, is a Republican who signed Alaska’s most recent 
severance tax bill, Senate Bill 21. The 28th Alaska State Legislature, which was 
responsible for voting on SB 21, has a Republican majority in both houses.167 
Similarly, North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple, a Republican, was in power 
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when House Bill No. 1198, was signed into law. House Bill No. 1198 contained 
amendments to North Dakota Century Code sections 57-51 and 57-51.1, which 
include North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax and Oil Extraction Tax, 
respectively.168 The Republicans had a majority in both houses when the Sixty-
third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota voted on the bills.169
 The information above is also summarized in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Alaska and North Dakota Case Study Comparison
Alaska North Dakota
State GDP (2012) (in 
millions of current dollars)  51,859 46,016
State GDP ranking 
(2012) 44 46
Natural Gas Production 
Ranking (2012) 11 15
Crude Oil Production 
Ranking (October 2013) 4 2
State Severance Tax 
Revenue (2012) (Amount 
in $ thousands)
 5,787,360  3,187,112
Share of State 
Severance Tax in Total 
Revenue (2012)
82.1% 56.7%
Political Party in Power 
at the Time of Tax 
Enactment
Republican Governor, 
Republican Majority in 
Alaskan Legislature
Republican Governor, 
Republic Majority in 
North Dakota Legislative 
Assembly
 Given these similarities between Alaska and North Dakota, I found it 
appropriate to use the two states for my case studies. Now that I have considered 
the similarities between Alaska and North Dakota, I will now go further into the 
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case studies by providing a detailed description of their severance taxes and 
revenue allocation. This will be followed by an analysis that explains what these 
findings mean in relation to my argument about externalities, the rights of future 
generations and severance taxation.
Alaska
 The Alaskan oil and natural gas severance tax, known as the Oil and Gas 
Production Tax, was recently amended with Senate Bill 21 (the More Alaska 
Production Act), which was signed into law May 21, 2013.170 This recent change 
mandated that starting in 2014 the tax rate changed to 35% of production value 
with no additional progressive tax.171 This compares to the previous tax structure 
which taxed 25% of production value and included a progressive tax set-up that 
went up to nearly 50%.172 In addition to this tax structure, Alaska’s Oil and Gas 
Production Tax includes many provisions for tax credits, such as tax credits for 
exploratory wells, which could take the severance tax as low as 14%.173 
Differences in the tax also depend on the region of where the oil and gas is 
produced, namely the North Slope, Cook Inlet or the rest of Alaska. Distinctions 
in the tax and applicable credits also depend on whether the gas is used-in-state or 
leaves the state.174 Since I am most interested in exploring the revenue allocation 
of the funds from the Oil and Gas Production Tax I will avoid discussing the 
intricacies of the tax credits built within the bill and will instead now turn towards 
the tax revenue allocation scheme.
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 The revenue allocation scheme of the Oil and Gas Production Tax was 
difficult to track down. Still, data from the Alaska Department of Revenue Tax 
Division indicates that a large portion of the Oil and Gas Production Tax revenue 
becomes unrestricted general fund revenue.175 This means it becomes revenue that 
is not restricted by statute or custom. The Oil and Production Tax revenue make 
up a large portion of this general fund revenue. In fact, the Production Tax makes 
up the largest portion of total oil revenue (63.8%) and in combination with 
Royalty Payment, Property Taxes and Corporate Income Taxes, the Production 
Tax contributed 92% of the total deposits to the unrestricted general fund revenue 
in FY 2013.176
  Once in the general fund, the Oil and Gas Production Tax revenue may be 
used for a number of services including education, health and human services, 
university, and transportation.177 The revenue may be appropriated by the 
Legislature towards general government operation and for capital improvements 
across the state.178
 Determining the allocation of the remainder of Alaska’s Oil and Natural 
Gas Production Tax revenue became a matter of searching and piecing together 
information. While looking through this data, information on all “Restricted 
Petroleum Revenue” source was given, that is, revenue that is restricted by statute 
or custom. This revenue included NPR-A Rents, Royalties, Bonuses; Royalties to 
AK Permanent Fund; Royalties to Public School Fund; and CBRF Deposits. This 
restricted revenue did not include the Oil and Gas Production Tax. Furthermore, 
“production tax applies only to oil and gas that the producer sells, so it excludes 
state royalties, gas used in lease operations or flared for safety reasons, and any 
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production that is re-injected into a reservoir.”179 Given this information, I ruled 
out the possibility of Oil and Gas Production Tax being a source of Restricted 
Petroleum Revenue for the general fund. This distinction is important because the 
Restricted Petroleum Revenue is allocated in specific, restricted ways within the 
general fund.
 As shown, the Production Tax makes a significant contribution to Alaska’s 
revenue, especially general fund revenue. The fact that the Production Tax 
contributes significantly to Alaska’s general fund may explain why Alaska does 
not levy general sales and gross receipts taxes or impose individual income 
taxes.180 It is difficult to determine beyond that if there are any additional amounts 
of Production Tax revenue allocated towards other funds besides the general fund. 
With this in mind, I will still briefly explore other potential areas of Production 
Tax revenue allocation.
 Within the text of Senate Bill 21 itself, there is mention of a “Community 
revenue sharing fund.” The bill updated this fund as follows:
 * Section 1. AS 29.60.850(b) is amended to read:                                         
 (b)  Each fiscal year, the legislature may appropriate to the community 
revenue sharing fund [AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 20 PERCENT OF 
THE] money received by the state during the previous calendar year under 
AS 43.20.030(c) [AS 43.55.011(g)]. The amount may not exceed                 
(1)  $60,000,000; or                                                                                         
 (2)  the amount that, when added to the fund balance on June 30 of 
the previous fiscal year, equals $180,000,000.181
Although it is unclear whether revenue from the severance tax is allocated 
towards this fund or whether the fund was just amended within the body of the 
bill text, we need not worry about the distinction. Further research about the 
community revenue sharing fund indicated that the community revenue sharing 
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fund is a fund established within the general fund “for the purpose of making 
community revenue sharing payments to municipalities, reserves, and 
communities for any public purpose.”182 In this sense, the purpose of the 
community revenue sharing fund is similar to that of the general fund in that it 
provides for general services and is included within the general fund allocations.
 An additional focus of my research became that of Alaska’s Permanent 
Fund. The Alaska Permanent Fund is well known for its dividend payouts to 
Alaskan residents. In 2013, Alaskan citizens received $900 from this fund,183 an 
amount Alaska Dispatch called “relatively low.”184 According to them, Alaskan 
received a low of $331.29 in 1984 and a high of $2,069 in 2008 from this fund. 
The Permanent Fund was created as constitutional amendment Article IX, Section 
15 in 1976 to put at least 25% of mineral lease rentals, royalties, etc. into a 
dedicated fund for its protection. This amount was increased to 50% after 
February 15, 1980. Under Alaskan Articles, the Permanent Fund is described as 
follows:
Section 37.13.010. Alaska permanent fund.
(a) Under art. IX, sec. 15, of the state constitution, there is established as a 
separate fund the Alaska permanent fund. The Alaska permanent fund 
consists of:
(1) 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, 
net profit shares under AS 38.05.180 (f) and (g), and federal mineral 
revenue sharing payments received by the state from mineral leases issued 
on or before December 1, 1979, and 25 percent of all bonuses received by 
the state from mineral leases issued on or before February 15, 1980;
(2) 50 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, 
net profit shares under AS 38.05.180 (f) and (g), and federal mineral 
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revenue sharing payments received by the state from mineral leases issued 
after December 1, 1979, and 50 percent of all bonuses received by the 
state from mineral leases issued after February 15, 1980;
(3) any other money appropriated to or otherwise allocated by law or 
former law to the Alaska permanent fund.
(b) Payments due the Alaska permanent fund under (a) of this section shall 
be made to the fund within three banking days after the day the amount 
due to the fund reaches at least $3,000,000 and at least once each month.
(c) The Alaska Permanent Fund shall be managed by the Alaska 
Permanent Fund Corporation established in this chapter.185
In addition to this structure, the findings indicate that the fund is established to 
recognize the value of the finite resources and their value for the people of the 
state and future generations:
Section 37.13.020. Findings.
The people of the state, by constitutional amendment, have required the 
placement of at least 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, 
royalty sale proceeds, and federal mineral revenue sharing payments and 
bonuses received by the state into a permanent fund. The legislature finds 
with respect to the fund that
(1) the fund should provide a means of conserving a portion of the state's 
revenue from mineral resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans;
(2) the fund's goal should be to maintain safety of principal while 
maximizing total return;
(3) the fund should be used as a savings device managed to allow the 
maximum use of disposable income from the fund for purposes designated 
by law.186
In this sense, at least in the establishment of the Permanent fund, there was 
recognition of the potential benefit the resource had for future generations. Given 
this indication, I was most interested in exploring this iconic fund to determine 
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whether the Oil and Production Tax revenue played a role in supporting this fund. 
I was also interested in determining whether the fund actually achieved what it set 
out to do as “a means of conserving a portion of the state’s revenue from mineral 
resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans.” As well as determining what it 
actually meant to “benefit” all. That is, did “benefit” mean paying future 
generations through dividends, or did it mean investing in resources that will 
benefit the economy and replace the resource use.
 Ultimately it appeared that there was no direct connection between the 
Production Tax and revenue that is directly allocated towards the Permanent 
Fund. That is, even though Alaska taxes extraction of nonrenewable natural 
resources and recognizes that revenues “from mineral resources [should] benefit 
all generations of Alaskans,” it does not actually make an institutional link 
between these two principles: from what I found, the Production Tax does not pay  
into the Permanent Fund. However, as mentioned earlier, Royalties and other 
forms of Restricted Petroleum Revenue are allocated to the AK Permanent 
Fund.187 Despite not being used for the Permanent Fund, there is the potential that 
the Production Tax could play a role in the Permanent Fund Dividend. Graphs 
indicating the general fund expenditures show revenue going towards the 
Permanent Fund Dividend.188 Since the Production Tax makes up for most of the 
general fund revenue, it could be assumed that Production Tax revenue may then 
contribute to these dividend payouts. This is even more strange, and more 
concerning from the perspective of the goals of this thesis: whereas the 
Production Tax does not pay into the Permanent Fund which explicitly provides 
the future generation clause, it does fund the dividend payouts. While in principle 
the extraction tax could recognize the rights of future generations, the labyrinth of 
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Alaska’s various funds proves, in practice, to capture it solely for the entitlements 
of the present.
 The Permanent Fund Dividend is money that is paid to Alaska residents 
from the investment earnings of mineral royalties.189 The value of each dividend 
is determined by the commissioner by October 1 of each year and is available to 
eligible Alaskan residents who apply through the Permanent Fund Dividend 
Division.190 Alaskan residents may receive a check from the department or have 
the dividend directly deposited into the individual’s financial account.191 In this 
sense, the people of Alaska are paid yearly through this Fund and thus are granted 
a share of the wealth made from the resources. It is also important to note is that 
Alaska’s Constitution states that the Fund’s principal cannot be spent (without a 
vote), which means the dividend can only be paid from Fund earnings. In this 
sense, there is the potential for no dividend payout if earnings were zero.192
 Although the Permanent Fund does give citizens payouts through the 
Permanent Fund Dividend, I was curious to know what the Permanent Fund 
principal was used for. Namely, I was interested to see if there was any other 
indication of investing in future research or renewable resources as options should 
oil and gas resources ran out, since the payout dividends did not indicate this 
notion whatsoever.
 I found that the Alaskan Legislature decides how the Fund income is used. 
To date, the Legislature has inflation-proofed Fund principal, paid dividends to 
qualified applicants (as discussed above), made special appropriations to the 
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principal and paid for some Fund-related state expenses.193 The Fund is also 
invested in stocks, private equities, hedge funds and public infrastructure.194 In 
this sense there is some notion of securing prosperity for future Alaskan 
generations through these investments; however I found no indication of 
investments into renewables or research. I found no indication of a guiding 
sustainability principle that preserves natural capital. I will explore the importance 
of this in the “Analysis” section of this chapter.
 Although there is still more to be known about the revenue allocation of 
the Production Tax, it is inarguable that the tax does play a profound role in its 
overall revenue generating ability for the state. As shown, the Production Tax 
contributes heavily to the general fund. Although the connection is not clear, it is 
also possible that some amount of Production Tax revenue contributes to the 
Permanent Fund Dividend. With this understanding of the Alaskan Oil and Gas 
Production Tax established, I turn now towards a policy discussion regarding the 
creation of this tax and its revenue allocation.
Alaska Policy Discussion
 In order to contribute to the discussion on Alaska’s severance tax, I will 
now explore the policy surrounding the most recent Senate Bill 21. This policy 
discussion will rely mainly on statements made and recorded in various news 
articles. I will follow-up this discussion with a look at statements and publications 
surrounding the creation of the Permanent Fund.
 The general statements surrounding Senate Bill 21 (what ultimately 
became the More Alaska Production), as shown through newspaper articles, 
indicate that the government made tax changes for the preference of industry. That  
is, the bill was passed, despite projections that it will decrease revenue from the 
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Oil and Gas Production Tax. In fact, projections by the Tax Division of the Alaska 
Department of Revenue show that the most recent changes of Senate Bill 21 will 
result in a revenue reduction of approximately $250 to $300 million in Fiscal Year 
2014.195 Beyond that, the governor acknowledged that the new tax structure 
should incentivize industry to come to Alaska.
 Statements in support of the bill and in support of industry in particular 
include statements made by Alaskan Governor Parnell. The Office of Governor 
Sean Parnell’s website actively promotes Senate Bill 21 and describes four 
“guiding principles” for the More Alaska Production Act (MAP Act). These 
principles include that the MAP Act is “fair” to present and future generations of 
Alaskans (because it provides a stable revenue stream and cuts billion dollar risk 
to Alaskan’s treasury); it “drives new production” by incentivizing more 
production with a per barrel credit and a Gross Revenue Exclusion for new oil; it 
is “simple” with a “balanced” fiscal impact across all oil prices by generating 
more revenues for the State treasury at low oil prices, while keeping Alaska 
competitive at high prices; and it is “competitive.”196 Whether the MAP Act 
actually achieves these principles is up for debate, but it is reflective of Governor 
Parnell administration’s language.
 I found that besides his focus on encouraging industry, Governor Parnell’s 
emphasis on competitiveness in comparison to other states was also interesting:
Alaska can now compete with states like North Dakota and Texas for 
investment capital and jobs. With Senate Bill 21, tax breaks will now be 
tied directly to putting new oil in the pipeline. The Alaska Legislature has 
sent a strong message to the world: Alaska is back, ready to compete, and 
ready to supply energy to America. Having produced only less than half of 
our known reserves, Alaskans have every reason to be optimistic about the 
future of our state. Senate Bill 21 lays the groundwork for a great Alaska 
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comeback. Thanks to the Alaska Legislature and our Administration 
members for seeing this through. A future of new jobs, new opportunities, 
and a bright future for all Alaskans starts now.197
In this quote, Governor Parnell names North Dakota and Texas as direct 
competitors to Alaska. This implies a focus of competing with these states 
through the tax changes so as to not lose industry to other oil and gas producing 
states.
 Perhaps because of this “benefit/encourage industry” approach, Senate 
Bill 21 was heavily criticized by many citizens. In fact, in April of 2013, citizens 
held rallies across the state in cities such as Juneau, Anchorage and Fairbanks 
among others. These individuals held signs protesting “Stop the Giveaway” and 
“SB will be the end of dividends.”198 These protests reflected the citizens’ belief 
that the MAP Act would give away their resource and money (dividends) 
associated with that resource. After the bill passed, opposition to this bill was so 
strong that the August 2014 primary will include a ballot referendum to repeal the 
tax; this referendum will be one of four referendums to have made it to the ballot 
in Alaska.199 While gathering signatures for the referendum petition, citizens 
argued that Senate Bill 21 was unconstitutional because the Alaskan Constitution 
requires that the state’s resources be managed for the maximum benefit of its 
people and they saw the new tax as making it easier for the industry to take 
resources without paying for them.200
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 Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the referendum 
demonstrates the strength of citizens’ opposition to the MAP Act. It indicates their 
belief that the bill gives away their resources at a cost to the revenue of Alaska 
and a cost to themselves (and their dividends). As this policy discussion has 
shown, at least in the most recent tax change, focus has fallen mainly on 
increasing and promoting industry in Alaska by providing benefits and tax breaks 
for them. In choosing industry over revenue, the government of Alaska has 
sacrificed a large portion of state revenue to come. It has also upset residents and 
resulted in the tax legislation being placed on a ballot referendum. In addition to 
these observations, there appears to be a lack of focus on resource management 
for future generations as shown both through the act of reducing state revenue to 
encourage industry and by the fact that there is more emphasis on production 
rather than conservation of the resources. As mentioned in the previous section, 
there is potential for a connection between Alaska’s oil and gas severance tax and 
its Permanent Fund. Although this connection is not clear, it is useful to the 
creation of the Permanent Fund to determine any intentions surrounding it. 
 Karl Widerquist and Michael Howard provide an analysis on the 
Permanent Fund in their book, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend Examining its 
Suitability as Model. In this book, they detail the conditions surrounding the 
formation of the Permanent Fund. They explain that Alaska, having only achieved 
statehood in 1959, was an impoverished state.201 Alaska had claimed entitlement 
lands that fortunately had oil fields in them. When, in 1968, the Atlantic Richfield 
Company discovered oil fields on the North Slope lands of Alaska, Alaska 
benefited greatly. The sale of state oil leases amounted to $900 million, which the 
state of Alaska used to build schools, create a loan program for college students 
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and to finance other public services. Despite this action, Alaskans felt a great deal 
of the money was wasted and did not help build Alaska’s overall economy. In 
order to avoid resource exploitation and waste of money, the idea of a permanent, 
or perpetual fund emerged as a potential solution.202 In 1970, Alaskan Governor 
Keith Miller proposed putting $500 million of the $900 million into a permanent 
fund to be a “revenue-producing fund in perpetuity for future generations of 
Alaskans.”203 His version of the fund did not pass. Another attempt at a permanent 
fund was vetoed by Governor Jay Hammond in 1975. He wrote in his veto 
message that a constitutional amendment was required to create a “permanent 
fund.” According to Widerquist and Howard, “Governor Hammond said he 
supported putting some of the oil money in a permanent fund to keep the 
government spending from growing so large that future Alaskans would face 
wrenching dislocations when the boom ended.”204 
 In 1976, voters created the permanent fund that exists in Alaska today 
through a constitutional amendment.205 With this fund established, Alaskans 
found a way to maintain wealth for the future. Widerquist and Howard give us a 
clear way to understand the initial intentions of the fund:
The overwhelming support for the amendment was best explained by 
Elmer Rasmuson, an Alaska banker who served as the first chairman of 
the trustees of the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC). “The 
Permanent Fund began, chiefly, with a ‘negative’ goal, to place part of the 
one-time oil wealth beyond the reach of day-to-day spending.” Ultimately, 
the Permanent Fund was the political product of a coalition that wanted to 
take money off the table and save it for the future, without specifying how 
those savings would be used.206
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In this sense, the fund was created with the future in mind, not to preserve natural 
capital, but rather to preserve wealth for the future. The difference is important to 
note; although this fund aims to preserve wealth, it is not directed to acknowledge 
the use and value of the resource itself. That is, it does not allocate wealth to 
replace capital by investing in renewables, technology or research. Furthermore, 
Permanent Fund Dividend payouts provide question as to whether the benefit of 
the future is truly kept in mind, as they indicate entitlement for present 
generations since they distribute wealth to current individuals. 
There were then debates, on how the fund should be invested. Some 
proposed that the fund be used as a development bank. Under a development bank 
scheme, loans, even risky ones, would qualify as income producing 
investments.207 In contrast, others proposed to manage the fund like a savings 
account, and they emphasized the need for prudent investment.208 Ultimately this 
fund was treated as a saving account. Legislation from 1980 restricted the 
Permanent Fund investments to a list of cautious, authorized investments.209 
Governor Hammond was a leading figure in the creation of the Permanent 
Fund Dividend (PFD). His interpretation of the state constitution gives us an 
indication of the mindset in creating the dividends:
Hammond incorporated into his thinking the notion that the Alaska 
constitutional provision mandating that the state use and develop its 
natural resources ‘for the maximum benefit of its people’ meant that 
Alaskans were in some sense owners of the state’s oil wealth in the same 
way as they would be if they were stockholders of a resource-owning 
corporation.210
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In this sense, Governor Hammond interpreted the constitution as suggesting the 
people of Alaska deserve a share of the wealth from oil. These views were 
important because, as Widerquist and Howard explain, under Alaska’s 
Constitution, the Alaskan governor is “more powerful than chief executives of 
other states.”211 In 1980 a Permanent Fund Dividend Bill was approved, with the 
removal of the individual income tax as the tactic that got it through. In this sense, 
corporations are now mostly responsible for paying the state’s taxes.212 The bill 
that was passed also included a provision that benefited residents who have lived 
in Alaska longer because they would earn more of the dividend. This was a 
provision of the bill that Governor Hammond and many legislators strongly stood 
by.213 However, this dividend payment based on cumulative residency was 
invalidated by the Supreme court. 
 In 1982 PFD debates were back into full-swing. Those who supported a 
PFD program argued that the program would motivate the public to protect the 
Alaska Permanent Fund; that dividends distribute wealth more equitably; that 
direct distribution of the fund’s income would provide a safety-net for low-
income residents; that individuals would have to right to decide how to use a 
portion of their oil wealth; and that economic analysis showed that dividends 
would provide “greater economic ‘bang for the buck’ than the alternatives of 
spending the same amount of money on the operating budget, capital projects, or 
loans to residents.”214 Finally, in 1982, the Permanent Fund Dividend was passed 
and that first year residents received $1000 checks.
 Hammond provides a historical and anecdotal account of the creation of 
the Permanent Fund and Permanent Fund Dividends in “Diapering the Devil.” He 
The Implications of a Severance Tax
94
211 (Widerquist and Howard 2012, 26)
212 (Widerquist and Howard 2012, 28)
213 (Widerquist and Howard 2012, 30)
214 (Widerquist and Howard 2012, 31)
explains how he was very personally involved in the establishment of the PFD. 
Hammond states, 
I believed the best, perhaps the only, way to meet our constitutional 
mandate to manage our natural resources for the maximum benefit of all 
the people was to grant each citizen an ownership share in Alaska’s 
resource wealth to be used as they, not the government, felt was for their 
maximum benefit.215
Hammond emphasizes furthermore that he felt that distributing the wealth by 
dividends would put the revenue in the public eye. By doing this, he felt he could 
protect the wealth from “invasion by politicians.”216 In this sense, he saw the 
dividends as a management solution to oil wealth instead of allowing politicians 
to continually use it for pet projects.
 Hammond provides insight into a number of policy issues surrounding the 
Permanent Fund and PFD. One thing that really stood out to me was his 
discussion on Alaska’s abolishment of the income tax. Deemed by Hammond, 
“the most stupid thing we could do,” the abolishment of the income tax came in as 
the Alaska Permanent Fund program was still being ironed out.217 Fearing a veto 
would jeopardize the new Permanent Fund program, Hammond proceeded to let it 
pass. He acknowledges now that the income tax repeal led to “uneconomic 
development”: that is development that does not generate "revenues for the state 
to offset the cost of providing services to the attendant population increase or for 
managing, enforcing, or enhancing resources being exploited.”218 I found this 
discussion insightful because it shows the recognition that abolishing the income 
tax was an unsustainable decision. The abolishment, as he argues, meant they had 
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decided to use up “one-time-only” oil dollars to pay for the income tax.219 
Although focusing more on wealth than natural capital, Hammond’s statements 
show some recognition of Alaska’s “double-dipping.” That is, of using the 
revenue to repeal taxes on the citizens instead of using it to allocate more funds 
towards conservation.
 As this discussion has shown, considerations surrounding the Permanent 
Fund and the Permanent Fund Dividend emphasize preserving wealth for the state 
and recognizing the citizen as owning a part of the oil wealth. But, what is left out  
of the picture in this case is the acknowledgement of the loss of natural capital. 
The Permanent Fund does not ensure for replacement of capital by investing in 
renewables, technology or research. Now that I have briefly considered the policy 
surrounding Alaska’s severance tax, I will turn towards the next case study: North 
Dakota. Following this consideration of North Dakota, I will analyze the two case 
studies by focusing on their revenue allocation and whether it successfully 
addresses the rights of future generations.
North Dakota
 North Dakota has two oil and natural gas severance taxes: the Oil and Gas 
Gross Production Tax and the Oil Extraction Tax. North Dakota’s Oil and Gas 
Gross Production Tax taxes $0.833 per thousand cubic feet (MCF) of gas (through 
June 30th, 2014). This value changes on July 1st each year. It also taxes 5% of the 
gross value of a natural gas or oil.220 There are a number of exemptions, but for 
argument purposes I will move forward in this discussion to explore the Oil 
Extraction Tax and revenue distributions of both taxes.
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 North Dakota’s Oil Extraction Tax focuses its taxation only on oil. The tax 
itself is imposed “upon the activity in this state of extracting oil from the earth, 
and every owner, including any royalty owner, of any part of the oil extracted is 
deemed…to be engaged in the activity of extracting that oil.”221 The Oil 
Extraction Tax rate is 6.5% of gross oil value or 4% of gross oil value if the well 
qualifies for a reduced rate. Qualifying wells in the Bakken formation are taxed 
2% of the gross oil value in order to better encourage oil exploration in that 
region.222 There are a number of additional exemptions, however with this basic 
foundation of North Dakota’s severance tax structures, I now consider the revenue 
allocation of North Dakota’s two oil and natural gas severance taxes. 
 The revenue scheme of the Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax is very 
complicated, but is as follows. The revenue collected by Tax Department is 
deposited into the Legacy Fund, the Tribal Share and the Oil and Gas Research 
Fund. The remainder is distributed by formula to the Oil and Gas Impact Grant 
Fund, Political Subdivisions, Abandoned Well Reclamation Fund and the North 
Dakota Heritage Fund. The state gets a share of that revenue, which is also 
distributed by formula to the General Fund, Property Tax Relief Sustainability 
Fund, Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund, State Disaster Relief Fund 
and then any additional revenues are transferred to the Legacy Fund.223 
 The revenue allocation of the Oil Extraction Tax has some similarities to 
the allocation of the Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax. For example, its revenue 
is also distributed to the Legacy Fund, the Tribal Share and the Oil and Gas 
Research Fund. Other funds are distributed by percentage: Foundation Aid 
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Stabilization Fund (10%), the Common Schools Trust Fund (10%) and the 
Resources Trust Fund (20%). Revenue from the Resources Trust Fund is 
distributed to the Energy Conservation Grant Fund and the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund. Like the Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax, a portion of this 
revenue also goes to the state, which is also distributed by formula to the general 
fund, Property Tax Relief Sustainability Fund, Strategic Investment and 
Improvements Fund, State Disaster Relief Fund and then any additional revenues 
are transferred to the Legacy Fund.224 See “Appendix A” for the complete revenue 
allocation chart.
 While this revenue allocation system may sound complex, we can 
understand it in the context of my argument by looking closer at a few of the 
funds. I would like to draw attention specifically to the general fund, the Legacy 
Fund, the Energy Conservation Grant Fund, the Renewable Energy Development 
Fund and the Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund.
 Similar to the Alaska general fund (and any general fund for that matter), 
the North Dakota general fund is used to finance a number of state services. This 
includes health services, higher education, elementary and secondary education, 
and public safety.225 The general fund is also spent on agriculture, industrial 
development and promotion, regulatory services, natural resources and general 
government activities.
 The Legacy Fund is somewhat similar to Alaska’s Permanent Fund. It was 
created in 2010 by the voters of North Dakota through constitutional amendment 
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Article X, Section 26 to the Constitution of North Dakota.226 Article X, Section 26 
states: 
Section 26.
1. Thirty percent of total revenue derived from taxes on oil and gas 
production or extraction must be transferred by the state treasurer to a 
special fund in the state treasury known as the legacy fund. The legislative 
assembly may transfer funds from any source into the legacy fund and 
such transfers become part of the principal of the legacy fund.
2. The principal and earnings of the legacy fund may not be expended 
until after June 30, 2017, and an expenditure of principal after that date 
requires a vote of at least two- thirds of the members elected to each house 
of the legislative assembly. Not more than fifteen percent of the principal 
of the legacy fund may be expended during a biennium.
3. Statutory programs, in existence as a result of legislation enacted 
through 2009, providing for impact grants, direct revenue allocations to 
political subdivisions, and deposits in the oil and gas research fund must 
remain in effect but the legislative assembly may adjust statutory 
allocations for those purposes.
The state investment board shall invest the principal of the North Dakota 
legacy fund. The state treasurer shall transfer earnings of the North Dakota 
legacy fund accruing after June 30, 2017, to the state general fund at the 
end of each biennium.227
As this portion of Article X, Section 26 shows, the Constitution requires that 30 
percent of total revenue derived from taxes on oil and gas production or extraction 
must be deposited into the Legacy Fund. Furthermore, Section 15-08. 1-08 
provides that if the balance in the Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund 
exceeds $300 million at the end of any month, 25 percent of any revenue received 
for deposit in the Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund must go instead 
into the Legacy Fund.228 The North Dakota Legacy Fund Investment Policy 
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Statement states, “…the goal of investment for the Legacy Fund is principal 
preservation while maximizing total return.”229 The Legacy Fund was initially 
only invested in short-term, fixed income investments, but now half of the Legacy  
Fund is invested in stocks, and the rest is in fixed-income and real estate.230 
 Also of note is that the Legacy Fund earnings are not accessible until 2017 
and the fund falls under the oversight of the Legacy Fund Advisory Board. 
Because the funds are not yet accessible, I cannot detail how the fund is used. I 
can, however, review debates surround this fund in order to determine the mindset 
surrounding its creation, namely to determine whether this fund is seen to carry a 
special purpose in protecting the wealth of the resource (as it being a 
constitutional amendment might imply). This will be reviewed in the following 
section.
 I will now briefly consider the Energy Conservation Grant Fund, the 
Renewable Energy Development Fund and the Strategic Investment and 
Improvements Fund. The Energy Conservation Grant was created by the 63rd 
North Dakota Legislative Assembly to provide funding for political subdivisions 
in making energy efficiency improvements to public buildings.231 The Renewable 
Energy Development Fund was established by the North Dakota Legislature in 
2007 and in 2013 the Legislature authorized $3,000,000 to be made available to 
the fund every two years. The fund serves to support North Dakota’s Renewable 
Energy Program, whose responsibilities include providing financial assistance to 
foster the development of renewable energy through research, development, 
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demonstration and commercialization.232 The Strategic Investment and 
Improvements Fund is meant to be used for expenditures to improve state 
infrastructure or initiatives to improve the efficiency of state government.233 As 
mentioned earlier, if funds in the Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund 
exceed $300 million at the end of any month, 25 percent of any revenue received 
must go instead into the Legacy Fund.234 The implications of this are interesting 
because it once again draws importance to the Legacy Fund. 
The information above is also summarized in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: North Dakota Funds Summary
Fund Purpose
General Fund Finances state services. 
Legacy Fund 
30 percent of total revenue derived from taxes on oil and 
gas production or extraction must be deposited into the 
Legacy Fund. Fund originally invested in short-term, fixed 
income investments, but now half of the Legacy Fund is 
invested in stocks, and the rest is in fixed-income and real 
estate. Legacy Fund earnings are not accessible until 2017.
Energy 
Conservation Grant 
Fund
 Provides funding for political subdivisions in making 
energy efficiency improvements to public buildings.
Renewable Energy 
Development Fund 
Supports North Dakota’s Renewable Energy Program. 
Program responsibilities include providing financial 
assistance to foster the development of renewable energy 
through research, development, demonstration and 
commercialization
Strategic 
Investment and 
Improvements 
Fund
Used for expenditures to improve state infrastructure or 
initiatives to improve the efficiency of state government. If 
funds in the Strategic Investment and Improvements Fund 
exceed $300 million at the end of any month, 25 percent of 
any revenue received must go instead into the Legacy Fund. 
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 These last three funds were briefly examined to demonstrate North 
Dakota’s attempts at addressing environmental issues and improvement. In this 
sense, their allocation structure is clear and understood. In the following section I 
will focus mainly on the Legacy Fund as a point of comparison to Alaska’s 
Permanent Fund. 
 As this section has shown, North Dakota’s oil and natural gas severance 
taxes contribute to a number of funds. Many of these funds acknowledge the 
importance of financing and developing renewable energy and research. A 
considerable amount of the revenue is also dedicated towards the idea of saving 
for the future, especially through the concept of the Legacy Fund. With this 
understanding of North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax and Oil 
Extraction Tax established, I turn now towards a policy discussion regarding the 
creation of this tax and its revenue allocation.
North Dakota Policy Discussion
 Similar to my description of Alaska, the policy surrounding the tax 
structure makes these findings more interesting in that it provides context to the 
decisions made in structuring the taxes. I will now review statements made in 
formation of the Legacy Fund in light of the North Dakota Oil and Gas Gross 
Production Tax and Oil Extraction Tax.
 Before discussing the Legacy Fund I must note that my search for articles 
surrounding HB 1198, the bill that included amendments to both the Oil and Gas 
Gross Production Tax and Oil Extraction Tax, was not fruitful. I was surprised to 
find very little news articles about this topic, which indicated to me that the 
severance tax updates in HB 1998 went largely under the radar. Still, despite the 
lack of media on the tax updates, North Dakota’s severance taxes have been 
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greatly successful, as evident by North Dakota’s severance tax revenue 
increase.235
 Given the great success of North Dakota’s severance taxes, there are 
questions about what move North Dakota might make next. In June 2014, voters 
will vote on a constitutional amendment to abolish property taxes. North Dakota 
might also, or instead, as Forbes speculates, abolish its income tax.236 This action 
would be very similar to the Alaskan government’s actions. By linking severance 
taxes with the abolishment of taxes for present citizens, North Dakota would be 
going in the opposite direction; they would be moving towards the “double 
dipping” we discussed earlier rather than towards sustainability.
 In addition to discussions made about the severance taxes, statements 
made surrounding the Legacy Fund also provide an indication of the intent behind 
its creation. As mentioned in the previous section, North Dakota’s severance tax is 
allocated to the Legacy Fund. The Legacy Fund was first proposed in 2008, but 
was rejected, perhaps due the revenue allocation structure to the fund.237 The 2008 
proposal called for $100 million of the oil and gas revenue to go to the state’s 
general fund, with anything remaining being deposited into the Legacy Fund. 
Residents objected, as the Fiscal Times clarifies: “Opponents, led by educators 
and school advocates, thought that measure gave lawmakers too much money to 
spend without restrictions.”238 The second proposal, with support from the 
education community, was approved in 2010.239
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 There is indication that the Legacy Fund was modeled after Norway’s 
Sovereign Wealth Fund, which was conceived to capture revenue that may by 
needed in the future. There is certainly evidence that the Legacy Fund was created 
with this same intent:
I'm a firm believer that when you harvest a one-time, finite resource, you 
have to put away some of that wealth for future generations," said North 
Dakota Sen. Dwight Cook, a Republican from Mandan.240
As this quote shows, there is some idea that representatives recognize the 
potential this fund has for sharing wealth with future generations. This recognition 
suggests some form of a sustainability principle. Still, this sharing of wealth does 
not necessarily recognize the preservation of natural capital. In this case North 
Dakota is concerned with parceling out the income from the natural capital (oil 
and gas), but is not necessarily worried about the depletion of natural capital 
itself. In other words, their recognition of the value and implications of depleting 
natural capital is indirect at best. This idea is reflected in other language 
surrounding the Legacy Fund. In the North Dakota Legacy Fund Investment 
Policy Statement, for example, the Mission of the Legacy Fund is listed: 
The Legacy Fund was created, in part, due to the recognition that the state 
revenue from the oil and gas industry will be derived over a finite 
timeframe. The Legacy Fund defers the recognition of 30 percent of this 
revenue for the benefit of future generations. The primary mission of the 
Legacy Fund is to preserve the real, inflation-adjusted purchasing power 
of the monies deposited into the Fund.241
In this sense, the Legacy Fund was created as a way to mitigate the use of the 
nonrenewable resources oil and natural gas for the “benefit” of the future. Similar 
to Alaska, the question of what “benefit” ultimately means in a policy sense and 
whether this compares to a sustainability principle is up for question. In order to 
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be considered sustainable they must ensure that the fund accounts for replacement 
of capital by investing in renewables, technology or research. In this case, since 
the use of the Legacy Fund will not be determined until it is available in 2017, I 
will be unable to comment on what it actually does, but instead can only comment 
on the function as spelled out in the Constitution and through policy discussions. 
As far as we can tell, the Constitution appears to recognize the concern of not 
spending a one time financial gain too quickly, but does not appear to 
institutionally recognize the drain of natural capital. Although mentioned in the 
constitutional amendment, it is important to note that the requirements outlined 
for the Legacy Fund are also mentioned in the severance tax bill text themselves. 
 There is evidence that this Legacy Fund serves more as a way to preserve 
wealth than it does a recognition of the value of the natural capital itself. That is, 
the acknowledgement is often that the Legacy Fund exists to protect North 
Dakota’s economy in the event of a shortfall. Labeled a “rainy day fund,” the 
Legacy Fund will ensure that the state has funds in place in case economic issues 
beyond the state’s control occur (such as if future resource extraction is not as 
lucrative).242 Majority Leader Rich Wardner, R-Dickinson commended the fund’s 
creation stating, “It looks good now, like the sky’s the limit…What we’re doing is 
very responsible.”243 With this statement Wardner reflects the sentiment that the 
Legacy Fund is a fiscally sound decision.
 Although the fund will not be available until 2017, there is discussion on 
how it will be spent once opened. An article in USA today stated:
Though the first dollars will not be spent for four years and economic 
conditions could change, lawmakers are beginning to consider how to 
spend the money. Education is always popular with lawmakers, and House 
Majority Leader Al Carlson said he likes Wyoming's college scholarship 
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program financed from its permanent fund. It is unlikely, Carlson and 
others said, that North Dakota, with a much smaller fund than Alaska, 
would write annual dividend checks to residents. "You have to be very 
careful about this. It's a one-time resource," said Carlson, a Republican 
from Fargo.”244  
In this sense, the Legacy Fund revenue could go to education, which would 
benefit citizens greatly, but we will most likely not see direct payouts in the form 
of dividends from North Dakota. Still, Representative Carlson’s comment about 
the importance of this “one-time resource” does suggest that legislators will be 
very careful and deliberate in decisions about how to use the fund revenue. 
However, once again, this language does not suggest a recognition of the 
preservation of natural capital.
 The governor of North Dakota, Governor Dalrymple, also provided some 
input about the use of the fund:
The governor noted that Norway, which has “the granddaddy of all 
endowment funds,” has not determined what to do with its energy bounty. 
“They’ve really been accumulating money for 20 years, and they’re still 
trying to decide whether to run the country on the money, to give the 
money back to people, invest a whole lot of money in infrastructure, 
eliminate all taxes,” Dalrymple said. “If you have a state endowment fund, 
how do you manage it? We’re not really far along either. We’re really just 
beginning to talk about what we’re going to do with it.”245
As Governor Dalrymple’s statement suggests, there are many considerations that 
the state must make before determining what they will do with the fund. All of the 
considerations he mentions have a lot to do with benefiting the residents or 
financing the state. In this sense, we do not see much consideration or recognition 
for the value of the resource and replacement of it.
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 Now that I have briefly considered the policy surrounding North Dakota’s 
severance taxes and Legacy Fund, I will now analyze the two case studies by 
focusing on their revenue allocation and whether it successfully addresses the 
rights of future generations.
Analysis
 As the previous discussion has indicated, there are differences in Alaska 
and North Dakota’s oil and natural gas severance tax, not just in the way the tax is 
structured to charge the extraction of the resource, but also in the way the 
generated revenue is handled. In fact, the distinction in revenue allocation is what, 
as I have argued, allows the severance tax to be designated as either 
“sustainability-focused” or “not sustainability-focused.” As I mentioned earlier, a 
“sustainability-focused” severance tax is defined as a severance tax that addresses 
all externalities associated with nonrenewable natural resource use including 
future generations. It does this by 1) placing some of the severance tax revenue 
into a fund for future generations and 2) ensuring that the fund accounts for 
replacement of capital by investing in renewables, technology or research. In 
contrast, a “not sustainability-focused” severance tax is defined as a severance tax 
that does not address all externalities including the rights of future generations 
and does not fulfill the two requirements listed above. 
 Before I analyze the revenue allocation of these two cases, I would first 
like to describe the differences in researching the case studies from my own 
firsthand experience. I do this to shed some light on what is transparent and what 
is not transparent about each state’s tax(es) from a research perspective. This is 
important to consider in reference to what we discussed in Chapter 1 about the 
role of policy in addressing social issues. As discussed, policy is expected to 
reason and act differently than individuals do. Thus, it is not unreasonable to hope 
that policy will try to educate citizens on its purpose and goals. My research on 
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Alaska and North Dakota’s severance tax policy revealed their ability (or 
inability) to clearly disclose their policy decisions and thus educate their citizens.
 While researching, I started with Alaska’s most recently updated severance 
tax. On the Alaska State Legislature website, I do admit it was easy to locate the 
Senate Bill 21 and read through it to discover how the tax was structured. What 
was not apparent in this bill was the revenue allocation structure. I went on what I 
deemed a “wild-goose-chase” to try and figure out just how the Oil and Natural 
Gas Production Tax revenue was allocated. I ended up finding information buried 
in the Revenue Sources Book Fall 2013,246 a 106 page report prepared by the 
Alaska Department of Revenue-Tax Division. Interestingly enough, the report did 
a thorough job explaining the tax structure and the structure of various funds, but 
seemed to lack information that connected the severance tax-to-fund revenue 
allocation structure. In this sense, Alaska’s policy does not clearly outline how the 
revenue was used; it does not teach its citizens clearly.
 In contrast, given North Dakota’s two severance taxes, the Oil and Gas 
Gross Production Tax and the Oil Extraction Tax, I did find it more difficult to 
locate the bill text to find the tax structure description. However, their revenue 
allocation could not be more obvious. Prepared by the North Dakota Legislative 
Council Staff, the 2013-2015 Oil and Gas Tax Revenue Allocation Flowchart247 
provides a clear look into exactly how much of the severance tax revenue is 
collected and where that revenue is allocated. This lists both the specific funds, 
the amounts and even descriptions of this fund. In this sense, North Dakota was 
very transparent about their revenue allocation from these taxes. In fact, out of 
curiosity, I “googled” this information instead of going through the North Dakota 
Legislative website and found this revenue allocation was the first hit. I provide 
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this personal anecdote to perhaps showcase the level of transparency surrounding 
each state’s severance tax allocation. Although the information is available for 
both states, North Dakota really brings it out into the open, while Alaska seemed 
to have obscured the allocation process. 
 Moving forward, I would now like to consider revenue allocation of 
Alaska’s and North Dakota’s severance tax in the context of my general argument 
surrounding nonrenewable natural resource management and the rights of future 
generations. In these cases we saw two alternatives for revenue allocation that had 
both similarities and differences. In the Alaska case, revenue from severance 
taxation was mainly deposited in the General Fund, while other portions of 
revenue may be related to the Permanent Fund, with some revenue handed off to 
citizens through the Permanent Fund Dividends. In this case study, there was an 
indication that Alaska recognized the importance of preserving and sharing wealth 
with its citizens, but did not account for the conservation of natural capital. In the 
North Dakota case, the revenue is allocated to a number of funds, with 30% 
allocated towards the Legacy Fund, which hints at a desire to save for the future, 
but also still lacks consideration for natural capital.
 When originally coming into these cases, I thought Alaska would clearly 
represent a “not sustainability-focused” severance tax solution and that North 
Dakota would clearly represent a “sustainability-focused” severance tax solution. 
These thoughts were based on preliminary research that indicated that the Alaska 
severance tax was allocated mostly to the general fund and that the most recent 
Alaskan severance tax change appears to have been done to benefit industry, 
while in contrast, North Dakota’s severance tax revenue was clearly stored away 
in the Legacy Fund to be saved for the future. Upon beginning my investigation 
into these two cases, however, I quickly determined that these cases were much 
more complicated than I had originally anticipated. In this sense, I recognized that 
there were many aspects to each of these severance taxes, that despite making 
Pricing Non-Renewable Natural Resource Use
 109
labeling difficult, could reveal many different things. For this reason, I decided to 
take a multiple-step approach to analyzing the cases. That is, I analyzed multiple 
allocations of the tax and labeled each specific allocation “sustainability-focused” 
or “not sustainability-focused” based on my definitions, instead of making a 
blanket statement about the whole tax.
  I turn now to a closer assessment of the cases of Alaska and North Dakota. 
With Alaska, as first indicated, a majority of Alaska’s severance tax revenue is 
allocated as unrestricted revenue towards the general fund. This means that the 
revenue is dumped into a general pot that is used for public services, which could 
be considered a major benefit of the tax from a political standpoint. It could be 
considered a major benefit because the residents of the state recognize the tax for 
providing a number of services to them. However, for my analysis, use of the tax 
revenue this way indicates the “double-dipping” discussed in Chapter 3, which 
results in the resource being used and additional money being made off of the 
resource through the tax, with no allocation towards the future. Thus, based off 
this alone, Alaska serves as an example of a “not sustainability-focused” 
severance tax—a tax that does not allocate funds for future generations.
 However, as we explored, there is a connection between the severance tax 
and the Permanent Fund Dividends that residents of Alaska receive. Although the 
dividends are paid off of earnings from the Permanent Fund and could be seen as 
fulfilling the first requirement I mentioned earlier of accounting for future 
generations (if we were in fact “the future”) by placing tax revenue into a fund for 
future generations, I cannot hold this revenue allocation appropriate under our 
argument structure. This is because the dividends do not guarantee the second 
requirement of repayment of resources. Residents may spend this revenue in a 
way which would not guarantee that replacement of capital is achieved. The only 
way replacement of capital could be achieved is by ensuring that the fund is 
invested in renewables, technology or research, which it is not. Thus, despite the 
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benefits that residents enjoy from this dividend, if connected to the severance tax, 
under my argument I will once again have to label the Alaskan severance tax as 
“not sustainability-focused.”
 Finally the question of the Permanent Fund itself is an interesting 
consideration. While I found no concrete evidence that the severance tax was 
clearly tied to this fund, I will consider it here under the assumption that the two 
are connected. As mentioned earlier, I found that the Permanent Fund does not 
appear to invest any of its principles into research, renewables or technology. This 
lack of investment in these areas shows that the benefit for future generations 
from the Permanent Fund is merely monetary and not cognizant of repaying for 
resource use explicitly. This means that, although structurally the Permanent Fund 
could achieve a sustainability goal, it does not. And thus, when combined in 
consideration of the severance tax, I must still consider the tax “not sustainability-
focused.”
 Also to note with the Alaska case is that these provisions for revenue 
allocation are not made in the text of the bill itself. This has a number of 
implications within my argument. The lack of provisions within the bill text 
means that no direct answer for what the severance tax is supposed to do or how 
the revenue is supposed to be allocated is given. In this sense, the law is not 
guiding, rather it is obscured. Because within my argument, the revenue allocation 
of the tax is a necessary part of making the severance tax a solution, this fact once 
again makes Alaska’s severance tax “not sustainability-focused.” 
 While I cannot completely rule out the fact that Alaska’s Oil and Gas 
Production may be used for future generations through investment in renewables, 
research or technology, the evidence has made clear that no direct connection 
between Alaska’s severance tax and considerations for future generations have 
been made. Thus, Alaska remains an example of a “not sustainability-focused” 
severance tax—a tax that does not allocate funds for future generations and does 
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not account for the replacement of capital. (That is until the “sustainability-
focused” severance tax occurs or is proven).
 I also explored North Dakota’s severance taxes. With the revenue 
allocation from these taxes, it is clear that revenue is set aside with some 
consideration of the future. This is especially clear within the revenue allocation 
framework that directs revenue specifically to the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund. As I explored in the North Dakota section, the Renewable 
Energy Development Fund supports North Dakota’s Renewable Energy Program, 
which provides financial assistance to foster the development of renewable energy  
through research, development, and commercialization. Based on this revenue 
allocation and this fund, I can label North Dakota’s severance tax a 
“sustainability-focused” severance tax because it provides funding to replace oil 
and natural gas resources, which would benefit future generations. Still, it is 
important to note that the revenue that will go to the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund is estimated to be only $3 million compared to the $2,287 
million the Oil and Gas Gross Production Tax and the $2,995 million the Oil 
Extraction Tax will bring in. To give another figure: the Legacy Fund is estimated 
to receive $1,502 million.248 In this sense, compared to the total revenue 
generated, the revenue allocated towards the Renewable Energy Development is 
rather insignificant.
 In the last two sections I also discussed North Dakota’s Legacy Fund. The 
Legacy Fund had a number of implications. The Legacy Fund was established in 
the North Dakota Constitution, but is specifically addressed in the severance tax 
text, along with all revenue allocations. A number of things may be said about this 
fact. First, I should acknowledge that North Dakota’s severance taxes are directly 
tied to specific revenue allocations within their text. This indicates a clear, 
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structural solution; it indicates that policy is fulfilling its role as educator. The 
Legacy Fund specifically, existing in the Constitution, indicates its strength and 
permanence. Thus in combination with the Constitution, the revenue allocation of 
the severance taxes is clearly outlined and defined by the law. Because my 
argument relies on clear allocation of severance tax revenue, North Dakota’s 
severance tax succeeds at potentially addressing future generations. 
 Of course, with the fund opening in 2017, we do not yet know how the 
revenue allocation will ultimately pan out. If North Dakota decides to do 
something similar to Alaska and payout dividends to its residents or remove taxes 
for current citizens, it will ultimately not fulfill provisions of providing resource 
research and replacement for future generations. By only focusing on conserving 
revenue and still failing to conserve natural capital for the future, the tax may 
ultimately become a “not sustainability-focused” severance tax in relation to its 
allocation of the Legacy Fund. As I discussed in the previous section, discussions 
indicate that this scenario is very likely. In contrast, if the Legacy Fund both puts 
aside revenue for future generations as well as ensures that the fund accounts for 
replacement of capital by investing in renewables, technology or research, then 
the severance tax in relation to its allocation of the Legacy Fund may be 
considered “sustainability-focused.”
Conclusions
 I conclude this section now having examined both cases and determined 
that Alaska’s severance tax is most likely a “not sustainability-focused” severance 
tax that does not go far enough to address all externalities including the rights of 
future generations because, as we saw, there is no indication that investments are 
made to acknowledge resource replacement for future generations. I also 
concluded that I can, to a small degree, label North Dakota (based on its 
Renewable Energy Development Fund) as a “sustainability-focused” severance 
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tax that 1) places some of the severance tax revenue into a fund for future 
generations and 2) ensures that the fund accounts for replacement of capital by 
investing in renewables, technology or research. Still, I also discovered that there 
are many ways in which North Dakota’s severance taxes do not go far enough as a 
solution. For example, the revenue allocated to the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund is rather insignificant compared to total incoming revenue and 
other fund allocations. Although I was not specific about the amount of revenue 
needed to be allocated sustainably, it is fair to argue that $3 million is not enough 
to replace the natural capital that is being used. Furthermore, North Dakota’s 
Legacy Fund could help them achieve a “sustainability-focused” severance tax, 
but based on their potential allocation, it appears they will most likely fail to 
address the replacement of natural capital.
 I would like to also note now that this analysis is not nearly as 
comprehensive as it could be. I am not an expert on taxes and cannot determine 
with absolute certainty that the severance taxes are not solutions in their current 
form. For example, there could be more evidence that Alaska is actually allocating 
their severance tax more sustainably than it appears. Furthermore, these 
conclusions are not absolute. Evidence might appear that the Legacy Fund plays 
out differently than expected. Thus “sustainability-focused” and “not 
sustainability-focused” labels for these severance taxes are not static terms—they 
are flexible dependent on what changes are made to the tax.
 One objection could be that Alaska does make renewable investment or 
conservation efforts. That would not change this analysis. The point is here, even 
if the general fund of Alaska is ultimately allocated to address the needs of future 
generations—there is nothing currently existing structurally that connects 
Alaska’s severance tax towards these protective properties.
 I end this discussion now having identified the intricacies of my case 
studies’ severance tax structure. The discussion revealed that politically, the case 
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studies recognized the preservation of wealth, but not of natural capital. These 
examples suggest that whereas severance taxes could be adapted to achieve 
sustainability goals, a lot of thinking would need to change in order for them to do 
so. I move forward now to a final policy recommendation that will once again 
require reflection on these cases.
……….
 In the midst of writing this section I receive an email from Professor Rabe. 
One of his colleagues, a professor at Muhlenberg College in Pennsylvania, had 
emailed asking for information about severance taxes:
Would you have the breakdown of the percentage of state revenue that 
comes from severance taxes?  I was talking with a Pittsburgh reporter 
today and told him about the large shares in Texas and Alaska and he was 
stunned and wondered if he could get the data.249
Professor Rabe forwarded me this email asking if I had any data (of course I had a 
lot), and was happy to send it his way. What interested me the most about this 
exchange was the part about the reporter being stunned. Most people are not 
aware of what a severance tax is let alone how much revenue it generates for 
states (remember the census bureau facts). 
 This is not a trend that exists on its own. Severance taxation is not a term 
that the general public is familiar with. Every time I explain my thesis project to 
someone, the word severance tax openly invites blank stares. I always follow up, 
“Oh, it’s a tax on the extraction of natural resources from the earth.” My hands 
make a pulling motion. They nod, eyes glazed, in response.
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Conclusion
Policy Recommendation
 This argument and analysis has built up to a policy recommendation. That 
is, when using a nonrenewable natural resource, states should account for all 
externalities of that use, including the externality as defined in previous chapters: 
the rights of future generations. In order to account for the use of nonrenewable 
natural resources, governing bodies should tax the extraction of that resource with 
a severance tax. In doing so they would acknowledge the removal of the resource. 
But this acknowledgement is not sufficient. In order to be sufficient as a solution, 
the severance tax must 1) place some of the severance tax revenue into a fund for 
future generations and 2) ensure that the fund accounts for replacement of capital 
by investing in renewables, technology or research. The case studies of Alaska 
and North Dakota have shown that there is room for thinking about the rights of 
future generations within a severance tax framework, but that a lot of thinking on 
the part of policymakers would need to change in order for them to completely do 
so. I will now discuss what structural adjustments could be made for these case 
studies as representative of my general policy recommendation for all states. This 
discussion will focus entirely on working towards using the severance tax as a 
means to mitigate nonrenewable natural resource use; it will not focus on 
adjusting the tax to increase revenue.
 In the case of Alaska, Alaska’s severance tax may be or may become a 
“sustainability-focused” severance tax by making sure that a portion of severance 
tax revenue is directly allocated to the Permanent Fund. The Permanent Fund is 
important as a solution because, as a constitutional amendment, it carries more 
authority and strength as opposed to funds created by regular legislation. In this 
sense, the Permanent Fund is more protected. Furthermore, it ensures that policy 
is fulfilling its “educator” role we discussed earlier. By clearly defining the 
allocation of the tax, policy can better outline its purpose and goals in doing so. 
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The Permanent Fund must then also be improved by ensuring that a portion of the 
principal goes towards research or renewable resource investment. It must do this 
to recognize the use of capital. Currently, as I found, the Permanent Fund 
investments do not address or promote sustainability, but by changing this, Alaska 
can ensure sustainability and that externalities of future generations are addressed.
 In the case of North Dakota, as I explored, the state government already 
allocates their severance tax sustainably through their Renewable Energy 
Development Fund. In order to make this allocation an even more sustainable 
solution, the amount allocated must be increased. Furthermore, similar to Alaska’s 
Permanent Fund, North Dakota’s Legacy Fund poses a chance to allocate revenue 
sustainability in a manner that is protected by the state constitution. In order to 
achieve the goal of allocating funds in a way that addresses the rights of future 
generations, North Dakota must decide explicitly how to allocate the Legacy 
Fund. When the revenue becomes available in 2017, North Dakota must allocate 
it towards renewables, technology and research investments that replace and 
repay the resource use of oil and natural gas for generations to come. If they 
decide to do otherwise, by using the Fund similarly to Alaska’s Permanent Fund 
and Permanent Fund dividends, then they will not address all externalities as 
previously defined and they will certainly not recognize the use of natural capital. 
The other option that North Dakota may have is to invest the principal of the 
Legacy Fund into renewables or technology that if developed, would replace the 
oil and natural gas resource that is used up.
 Expanding this policy recommendation towards all states, it is clear that in 
order to address all externalities associated with nonrenewable natural resource 
use, the state should employ a severance tax. This tax will directly acknowledge 
the removal of the resource in question by taxing the value or volume produced. 
Beyond that the state must allocate the revenue from this tax in a manner that 
actually replaces the resource and recognizes the use of natural capital. This 
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means the revenue must provide for the replacement by addressing technology or 
research or recognizing the energy value of oil and natural gas and investing in 
alternative forms of energy such as renewables. If the state’s policy fails to do 
this, it will not serve as a solution to managing nonrenewable natural resource 
use.
 Of course, if a severance tax was implemented in a way that generated a 
lot of revenue, not all revenue must to go towards renewable investments and 
research, but a significant portion must, that is, enough to repay the resource use. 
Thus, other earnings could be used to satisfy the citizens of today through 
dividends or general fund allocation. This is an important consideration when we 
consider the political feasibility of this recommendation.
 As this thesis has illustrated, policy should be different than the individual; 
it should make decisions for the benefit of the public. Policy should also have a 
teaching function; it should play a role in educating its citizens in questions of 
socially beneficial actions. Given this understanding, I recommend that the 
revenue allocation be specifically written out within the severance tax legislation 
so as to clearly layout exactly how the revenue is allocated. Furthermore, the fund 
involved in renewables and research investment would benefit from being a 
constitutional amendment, much like the Alaska and North Dakota case. This is 
because a constitutional amendment would secure the stability of the fund and 
revenue allocation scheme much better than a general statute. Taking these actions 
would ensure that policy was playing an active role in educating its citizens.
 When making this policy recommendation, the strengths and weaknesses 
of the recommendation must also be considered. As this thesis explored earlier, 
questions of feasibility are an important consideration to any proposed solution. 
The literature I reviewed indicated that even the best theoretical solutions will 
face challenges if not supported by political interest. I went as far as to argue that 
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the political feasibility of an idea is one of the biggest determinants in whether the 
idea will ultimately become policy.  
  There are a number of weaknesses to this recommendation. These include 
especially the political feasibility of this proposal. The severance tax may face 
challenges in this feasibility criteria. For example, a severance tax may face 
opposition from industry, and, depending on the amount of opposition, this may 
inhibit passage of a severance tax. Reflecting back on our discussion of carbon 
taxes and cap-and-trade, we can recall that those solutions faced this type of 
feasibility problem. The political challenges they faced prevented the carbon tax 
and cap-and-trade from seeing overall implementation within the United States. 
Still, as we explored earlier, a large number of states already employ severance 
taxes. The benefit then, is that severance taxes already exist structurally within 
those states and adjusting them may be politically easier than creating them.
 Still, the second political hurdle may be convincing residents of a state 
that allocating money towards future research, investment in renewables and 
replacement of the resource may be worthwhile. As we explored earlier, the 
revenue distribution of a market-based solution plays a large role in its political 
feasibility. In the case studies we saw that the public is interested in receiving 
personal benefits from the revenue. For example, although the residents of Alaska 
were outraged by the severance tax benefits given to industry, their main 
motivation seemed to be because that directly cut into their personal dividends. In 
that example, the residents were most concerned with how the tax would benefit 
them and protect their resource, as opposed to considering it a resource they share 
with future generations. I underscore this because it suggests that whereas 
structurally severances taxes could be adapted to sustainability goals, a lot of 
thinking on the part of both policymaker and citizen would need to change in 
order for them to do so. Although this is a potential political hurdle, there is 
descriptive evidence that people do care about the future to some extent. As we 
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saw with the Alaska and North Dakota case, the Permanent Fund and the Legacy 
Fund were voted by the people into the constitution for the benefit of future 
generations. At least in the language, we do see consideration of the future, which 
indicates this proposal could find some support in residents of today’s states. 
 We also saw political support within the work of political scientist Leigh 
Raymond. As Raymond argued, there has been a shift towards agreement in the 
idea that the public does own common resources. Because the argument to 
employ severance taxes and allocate revenue to replace natural capital promotes 
the idea public ownership, under Raymond’s argument, it may become more and 
more politically feasible in the modern political sphere. Of course I noted in 
earlier sections that the limitations of this feasibility rely on the answer to whether 
policy will ultimately adopt the populist view of public ownership or the 
government as decision makers view.
 The strength of this proposal beyond that, as described, is that it fits within 
a framework that currently exists. In this sense, we can find answers to questions 
of resource use and management by merely manipulating the structures existing 
today. We can continue or begin to price, to tax, nonrenewable natural resource 
use and then adjust the way we use that revenue. In doing so, we can see that the 
severance tax has implications beyond general revenue accumulation. Instead, we 
can understand that the severance tax has broader implications for how to 
responsibly and sustainably use and manage resources for tomorrow, today. 
Implications
 The implications of this recommendation, if fully achieved, indicate that 
there is a way to responsibly use and manage nonrenewable natural resources for 
today’s generation and for generations to come. It would answer the question of 
whether solutions could exist to mitigate resource use and preserve the use of 
resources for future generations. Beyond this recommendation there are more 
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implications for the potential of severance taxation. We will now consider these 
here.
 I think a lot can be said about severance taxation and its general revenue 
raising ability. As indicated in our discussion of Alaska and North Dakota, 
severance taxation accounts for a large portion of state revenue. “Appendix B” 
shows the severance tax collections for all states from 2002-2012. As this table 
indicates, severance taxation is important for raising revenue in a number of 
states, while other states lack a severance tax and are missing out on potential 
revenue from this form of taxation. That being said, if more states were to 
recognize the revenue generating ability of severance taxation and were to 
implement severance taxes, they too may benefit from this revenue creation. 
 Besides using this revenue to address nonrenewable natural resource 
management for the sake of future generations, states could also benefit from 
using a portion of this revenue to address current externalities. Although not part 
of my argument, we can see that the general revenue raising ability of severance 
taxation could address a number of issues with resource use. For example, when it  
comes to the resource use of oil and natural gas, typical regulatory schemes target 
the production of carbon and other externalities of oil and natural gas use. For 
example, market-based schemes such as cap-and-trade or a carbon tax attempt to 
lower carbon emissions and remove that externality of oil and natural gas 
consumption. Severance taxation could partially be used to address these types of 
issues. That is, the revenue could address externalities of production and possibly 
serve as a way to somewhat target carbon emissions on the consumption side, as 
Professor Rabe once put it, as a potential “back door carbon tax.” Although this 
has not been explored in this thesis, it is another possibility to consider.
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Final Discussions
 I must also consider the weaknesses of this analysis and policy 
recommendation as a whole. For example, I am not an environmental economist 
and cannot confirm the use of severance taxation for nonrenewable natural 
resource management through models and a complete environmental economics 
framework. In this sense these questions and answers must be considered more 
thoroughly. Still, my work can be considered a first attempt to ask these questions, 
consider solutions and promote ideas through a theoretical lens—a political 
theorist lens.
 As noted in this thesis, there is value to reviewing and exploring ideas in 
interdisciplinary ways. This thesis worked to explore the value we should place 
on finite resources from a theoretical lens by reviewing the arguments of 
environmental and ecological economists. It also attempted to connect the 
exploration of the value of the finite resource by delving into the policy sphere. In 
doing so, this thesis provided a way to understand the relationship between 
multiple fields when viewing issues that the greater society faces.
 This thesis also serves to start the discussion on how we think about the 
use of a finite resource. That is, whether we care to notice our use, whether we 
care to find solutions, and whether policy could find a solution. By starting these 
conversations, I hope to open the door to these questions of how we choose to 
understand and perhaps adapt our understanding of nonrenewable natural resource 
use.
 And finally, there are implications about the research of severance taxation 
in general. In fact, I found this research and discussion, while writing, even more 
so interesting given its lack of literature. Upon researching I found little 
consideration of severance taxes. That said, it is clear that we need more literature 
to fully understand the current structure of severance taxes and their potential as 
both a current policy strategy and a future resource management technique.
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…………….
 This thesis is not only about severance taxation and its potential for 
addressing nonrenewable natural resource management. It is also a self story. This 
thesis is an accumulation of my college experiences. My advisors have 
encouraged me and led me to environmental theory (Professor Disch) and 
environmental policy (Professor Rabe). They have provided the foundation for 
these thoughts and subsequent research. Because of their initial push, I was 
inspired to bring the story to light. Even if I am ultimately wrong—or if someone 
disagrees with the premises of my normative argument—I hope to encourage 
further research and exploration into this fascinating topic.
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Appendix A
Appendix A: 2013-15 Oil and Gas Tax Revenue Allocation Flowchart
Source: North Dakota Legislative Council. July 2013. “2013-15 Oil and Gas Tax Revenue 
Allocation Flowchart.” 15.9055.01000. http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/15.9055.01000.pdf?
20140124111003.
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Appendix B
Appendix B: State Severance Tax Revenue Summary
Figure 3
State Severance Collections By Year (2002-2012)
(Amounts in $ thousands)
State 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Alabama 65,667 104,386 113,646 144,813 182,778 144,306 197,581 115,374 90,538 115,975 116,467
Alaska 551,293 640,856 697,394 925,699 1,274,642 2,436,660 6,939,040 3,829,564 3,355,049 4,238,789 5,787,360
Arizona 6,417 14,662 15,544 26,338 40,494 43,560 43,757 19,481 33,372 40,237 40,578
Arkansas 13,217 15,213 15,840 18,565 22,225 21,579 27,820 33,547 65,147 79,656 82,770
California 28,569 12,485 14,471 14,251 16,048 31,526 31,599 27,105 24,409 31,879 37,112
Colorado 57,130 37,245 115,884 145,114 212,753 136,888 151,474 285,015 71,436 146,690 175,090
Connecticut ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 12 ----------- 61 60 64
Delaware ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Florida 40,114 46,700 48,651 59,121 55,790 45,870 56,000 81,300 71,000 59,020 49,860
Georgia ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Hawaii ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Idaho 3,650 2,450 2,568 2,488 2,897 6,649 6,758 4,952 6,730 7,787 8,309
Illinois 259 295 349 448 564 354 0 ----------- 0 ----------- 0
Indiana 652 652 563 695 947 1,003 1,680 162 1,426 1,825 2,212
Iowa ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Kansas 66,810 85,271 98,148 117,424 149,676 132,281 168,696 142,658 102,878 122,152 132,907
Kentucky 187,416 172,202 187,109 228,848 281,581 275,313 293,334 355,985 317,146 342,320 346,050
Louisiana 493,662 482,340 476,609 711,766 716,396 904,164 1,035,695 911,433 758,469 729,260 885,982
Maine ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Maryland ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Massachu-
setts
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Michigan 31,688 49,118 58,220 68,055 90,956 81,874 113,506 59,343 57,424 80,423 64,285
Minnesota 13,477 23,083 14,814 32,348 28,022 34,591 31,821 45,820 23,290 27,618 46,370
Mississippi 31,897 47,241 53,809 66,275 89,910 81,814 135,248 113,762 90,832 112,326 116,378
Missouri ---------- 33 53 75 49 58 21 18 2 5 2
Montana 88,882 111,095 83,503 181,201 247,385 264,740 347,221 349,714 253,649 278,372 305,617
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Nebraska 1,221 1,782 1,806 2,560 2,820 2,499 4,968 4,718 3,473 4,440 5,355
Nevada 21,493 25,162 37,155 39,691 44,526 62,178 74,130 145,450 182,752 272,240 303,038
New 
Hampshire
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
New Jersey ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
New Mexico 453,397 483,739 587,625 712,539 923,304 942,354 625,938 931,832 654,752 804,586 768,106
New York ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
North 
Carolina
1,889 1,858 1,894 1,932 1,967 1,898 1,889 1,740 1,464 1,610 1,562
North 
Dakota
138,244 161,253 175,625 262,339 346,672 391,337 791,692 827,417 1,136,553 1,883,816 3,187,112
Ohio 8,655 8,065 8,112 7,920 7,675 7,015 9,420 11,052 10,550 11,197 10,182
Oklahoma 364,459 547,951 655,051 762,506 1,059,919 942,148 1,184,765 1,067,182 743,686 830,662 848,947
Oregon 29,612 25,797 16,603 12,148 12,032 12,513 11,815 13,038 12,742 13,199 14,119
Pennsylva-
nia
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
Rhode 
Island
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
South 
Carolina
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
South 
Dakota
2,191 2,755 2,012 2,870 4,355 4,700 6,838 7,668 8,410 10,596 13,759
Tennessee 1,120 1,095 1,061 1,438 1,796 1,604 2,357 2,413 2,251 2,355 2,450
Texas 974,727 1,501,289 1,896,803 2,347,512 3,216,387 2,762,940 4,124,428 2,338,481 1,737,136 2,677,604 3,655,582
Utah 28,972 37,788 50,009 73,434 99,517 101,539 106,060 102,121 89,162 101,665 107,075
Vermont ---------- ---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------
Virginia 1,644 1,608 1,680 1,772 1,852 2,006 2,060 1,997 1,882 1,923 1,986
Washington 43,418 38,360 37,624 43,034 48,446 48,727 44,038 29,681 20,905 26,706 36,302
West 
Virginia
177,093 193,680 204,126 307,265 336,387 328,320 347,592 376,677 417,230 585,992 626,203
Wisconsin 3,460 3,295 4,610 3,476 3,739 4,960 5,290 4,211 5,004 5,631 5,013
Wyoming 301,594 440,757 683,208 805,613 1,043,160 803,632 883,786 1,197,540 721,002 1,044,150 968,525
---------------- indicates that a state does not collect this tax.
Source: United States Census Bureau, Governments Division. http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax.
Figure 4
Share of State Severance Tax in Total Tax Revenue By Year (2001-2012)
State 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Alabama 1.75% 1.01% 1.63% 1.62% 1.86% 2.14% 1.63% 2.18% 1.39% 1.08% 1.34% 1.30%
Alaska 54.06% 50.60% 57.21% 51.92% 49.81% 51.31% 66.06% 79.46% 77.27% 74.18% 76.54% 82.10%
Arizona 0.05% 0.08% 0.17% 0.16% 0.24% 0.30% 0.30% 0.33% 0.17% 0.33% 0.33% 0.31%
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Arkansas 0.32% 0.26% 0.30% 0.28% 0.28% 0.32% 0.29% 0.37% 0.45% 0.86% 1.00% 1.00%
California 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03%
Colorado 0.82% 0.83% 0.56% 1.64% 1.90% 2.49%% 1.49% 1.57%% 3.28% 0.83% 1.55% 1.71%
Connecticut 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Delaware 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Florida 0.20% 0.16% 0.17% 0.16% 0.17% 0.14% 0.12% 0.16% 0.25% 0.23% 0.18% 0.15%
Georgia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Hawaii 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Idaho 0.10% 0.16% 0.10% 0.10% 0.08% 0.09% 0.19% 0.19% 0.16% 0.23% 0.24% 0.25%
Illinois 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Indiana 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Iowa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Kansas 2.29% 1.39% 1.70% 1.86% 2.08% 2.39% 1.92% 2.36% 2.13% 1.58% 1.79% 1.79%
Kentucky 2.23% 2.35% 2.07% 2.21% 2.52% 2.90% 2.78% 2.92% 3.65% 3.32% 3.36% 3.30%
Louisiana 6.45% 6.71% 6.47% 6.16% 8.24% 7.35% 8.24% 9.41% 8.93% 8.66% 8.23% 9.85%
Maine 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Maryland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Massachu-
setts 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Michigan 0.28% 0.14% 0.22% 0.24% 0.29% 0.38% 0.34% 0.46% 0.23% 0.25% 0.34% 0.27%
Minnesota 0.01% 0.10% 0.17% 0.10% 0.20% 0.16% 0.19% 0.17% 0.27% 0.14% 0.15% 0.23%
Mississippi 0.74% 0.67% 0.94% 1.05% 1.22% 1.50% 1.26% 2.00% 1.75% 1.45% 1.67% 1.67%
Missouri 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Montana 8.82% 6.16% 7.47% 5.14%% 9.66% 11.63% 11.41% 14.13% 14.53% 11.84% 12.08% 12.43%
Nebraska 0.07% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.12% 0.12% 0.09% 0.11% 0.12%
Nevada 0.77% 0.54% 0.61% 0.79% 0.70% 0.72% 0.99% 1.21% 2.59% 3.13%% 4.30% 4.50%
New 
Hampshire 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
New Jersey 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
New 
Mexico 16.87% 12.50% 13.41% 14.68% 15.91% 18.07% 17.05% 12.01% 19.34% 15.13% 16.16% 15.10%
New York 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
North 
Carolina 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
North 
Dakota 14.14% 12.37% 13.69% 14.29% 18.69% 21.37% 21.95% 34.24% 34.27% 42.96% 49.28% 56.70%
Ohio 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
Oklahoma 11.21% 6.02% 9.28% 10.19% 11.12% 13.56% 11.57% 14.22% 13.03% 10.51% 10.70% 9.62%
 127
Oregon 0.59% 0.57% 0.45% 0.27% 0.19% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.18% 17.00% 0.16% 0.16%
Pennsylva-
nia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Rhode 
Island 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
South 
Carolina 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
South 
Dakota 0.22% 0.22% 0.27% 0.19% 0.26% 0.37% 0.37% 0.52% 0.57% 0.64% 0.77% 0.90%
Tennessee 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Texas 6.95% 3.40% 5.16% 6.17% 7.16% 8.79% 6.85% 9.06% 5.49% 4.41% 6.20% 7.50%
Utah 1.27% 0.74% 0.96% 1.19% 1.56% 1.82% 1.67% 1.74% 1.88% 1.75% 1.86% 1.84%
Vermont 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Virginia 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Washington 0.44% 0.34% 0.30% 0.27% 0.29% 0.30% 0.28% 0.25% 0.18% 0.13% 0.15% 0.21%
West 
Virginia 4.90% 4.99% 5.39% 5.44% 7.14% 7.40% 7.07% 7.12% 7.87% 11.45% 11.39% 11.70%
Wisconsin 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03%
Wyoming 37.47% 27.56% 36.21% 45.40% 46.31% 29.15% 36.98% 36.75% 43.33% 33.41% 42.41% 37.97%
Source: United States. Census Bureau, Governments Division. http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax.
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